CAN PAKISTAN BE SAVED?
MAHNAZ ISPAHANI

THE OTHER WMD SCANDAL
THE EDITORS

THE NEW REPUBLIC
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SUPERPOWER EUROPE

Why America Should Fear Europe's Economy
PHILIPPE LEGRAIN

Why America Should Fear European Integration
ANDREW SULLIVAN



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

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CORRESPONDENCE

COMMON CAUSE

SHANNON BROWNLEE IS OFF THE mark in "Shot in the Arm" (May 12). Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a variant of the virus that causes the common cold. Were it possible to make a vaccine that would be used by about six billion people (particularly if it had to be refreshed periodically), do you think any profit-minded pharmaceutical company would pass it by?

The problem is that antiviral medications (such as acyclovir) are notoriously difficult to make and easy for the viruses to evade. But there is a resource: the National Institutes of Health (NIH). To the detriment of all other science in this country, Congress—the ultimate font of wisdom—has lavished funds on the NIH beyond the fondest dreams of the workers there. The NIH is so busy putting up new buildings to absorb the cash thrown its way, you'd think Bechtel was in charge. It's time to have the NIH develop, test, and manufacture a vaccine for SARS (provide a royalty-free license to anyone else who wants to make it) and do it now.

CHARLES KELBER
Rockville, Maryland

DADDY DAY CARE

ANN HULBERT DESCRIBES THE "short shrift" given to fathers who duck the second shift in a number of books she read about "the harried life of the working mother" ("Father Time," May 5). Had Hulbert reached into a different pile of books, she might have found that some fathers and mothers have moved to a new reality, different from the disengaged-father model that Hulbert seems to welcome. For example, *Fatherneed* by Kyle D. Pruett and *Father Courage* by Suzanne Braun Levine document that men have begun to shoulder more parenting and household duties and that everybody benefits when they do.

Modern life works better when we combine the best of both the roles Hulbert describes: mother's interest and engagement and father's relaxed and fun attitude toward parenting. Otherwise, if we follow Hulbert's



suggestion—and women become more like men without men becoming more like women—our children will lose something they need: besotted parents. And men will continue to miss something they would love: being a besotted parent.

JULIE SHIELDS
Author, HOW TO AVOID THE MOMMY TRAP: A ROADMAP FOR SHARING PARENTING AND MAKING IT WORK
McLean, Virginia

AS ONE OF THE HUSBANDS WHO allegedly endured "dissing" and was given "short shrift" in books such as the recent collection *The Bitch in the House*, I read Hulbert's "Father Time" with great interest. My wife, in fact, is Cathi Hanauer, editor of *The Bitch in the House*. In Hulbert's article, I'm the husband accused of such ghastly crimes as repeatedly failing to put coffee filters on the shopping list and sometimes being able to relax and read the paper when my wife can't.

While I sympathize with the frustrations of the working women in *The Bitch in the House* (and love the book), I couldn't agree more with Hulbert's desire to hear the men's side of these issues. As I read the essays in my wife's book, I found myself wondering time and again how husbands would respond if given a chance. Are we really as hapless and bumbling as we're portrayed? Is it true, as one reviewer commented, that we husbands—no matter how accomplished professionally and well-intentioned domestically—"can't be trusted with simple tasks"?

On this front, I'm happy to report that I'm currently compiling a men's companion version to *The Bitch in the House*, titled *The Bastard on the Couch: 26 Men Try Really Hard to Explain Their Feelings About Love, Loss, Fatherhood and Freedom.*

DANIEL JONES
Northampton, Massachusetts

BLACK GOLD

PETER BEINART, IN HIS TRB column "Free Form," seems to believe that all nation-building outlays stem ultimately from the U.S. budget (May 5). He insists that the American taxpayer shoulder the $15 billion to $20 billion burden of rebuilding Iraq when that nation has at its disposal considerable oil wealth for the task. In fact, the three million barrels per day that Iraq is easily capable of producing would generate more than that amount per year at today's price. Even if the price of oil were to fall to $20 per barrel, this output would match the upper limit of Beinart's range for rebuilding.

MILTON EZRATI
New York, New York

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Empty Cabinet

TRB
FROM WASHINGTON

OVER TWO YEARS AGO, AT A Labor Party Central Committee meeting on whether the party should join Ariel Sharon in a national unity government, former Prime Minister Shimon Peres engaged the crowd in a distinctively Israeli call-and-response. "Achieving peace involves painful concessions on all sides," he declared, quoting Sharon. Then, according to *Haaretz*, he asked rhetorically, "Is that Lieberman?" "There will be no new settlements," Peres continued. "Is that Lieberman?" Then finally, "A Palestinian state—is that Eitam?"

"Lieberman" referred to Avigdor Lieberman, the Russian-born ultra-hawk who leads the National Union Party. Effie "Eitam" heads the settler-dominated National Religious Party (NRP). Peres's argument was clear: Sharon would not pursue peace with the Palestinians if he formed a narrow coalition with right-wing extremists. And that argument won the day. Labor joined a national unity government, which lasted until this January—when it challenged Sharon at the polls and was crushed.

Peres's words are actually more relevant today than when he uttered them. Two years ago, Sharon had barely begun his evolution toward the political center. He had not yet said, as he did last month, that "the moment has arrived to divide this tract of land between us and the Palestinians." He had not said that only a "political solution" with the Palestinians could revive Israel's economy. And he had not adopted the peace camp's terminology and called Israel's dominion over the West Bank and Gaza Strip an "occupation." In short, Sharon is far more deserving of Peres's support today than he was two years ago. And yet, today, as Sharon begins a series of excruciatingly difficult negotiations with the vulnerable and untested Mahmoud Abbas, Labor is not in the government. And Avigdor Lieberman and Effie Eitam are.

The result is that a prime minister who seems to desire a Palestinian state leads a government that largely does not. Consider the Israeli Cabinet's vote on accepting the U.S.-backed "road map" to peace. The two ministers from Lieberman's National Union and the two from Eitam's NRP each voted no. Only seven of the 14 ministers from Sharon's own Likud voted yes and only because Sharon attached 14 "revisions" to the plan, some of which explicitly contradict it. Sharon's Likud defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, said his yes vote should not be considered a sign of support for a plan he called "bad."

In fact, the plan only passed because it won the support of all five Cabinet members from Shinui, a militant secular party with hitherto ill-defined views on the Palestinian conflict. As Nahum Barnea, columnist for the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Ahronot*, put it, "Most of the ministers in the current Cabinet are prepared to support a peace initiative only if they are assured that it will never be implemented."

And, if Sharon keeps them in their jobs, they may get their wish. Eitam, who has called for destroying the Al Aqsa Mosque and rebuilding the ancient Temple in its place, is housing and construction minister, which puts him in charge of settlement-building, precisely the activity the road map is supposed to halt. His condition for entering Sharon's government was that settlement growth continue unimpeded. Lieberman, who joined the government after Sharon promised him the Cabinet would have veto power over relations with the Palestinians, himself lives in the isolated West Bank settlement of Nokdim, long slated for removal in any peace deal.

Sharon's more centrist views are far closer to Israeli public opinion. But he is not immune to pressure from his base. Last week, at the same angry meeting of Likud legislators where Sharon called Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza an "occupation," a lawmaker from the settlement of Ariel asked whether his children would have to move. "You can build [there] for your children and grandchildren, and I hope even for your great-grandchildren," the prime minister replied—although Ariel sits well inside the West Bank. If Sharon truly believes that, he may not be serious about a peace deal himself. Or, perhaps, he knows better but also knows he must take a step back to appease his right-wing allies every time he takes one forward.

With the Israeli right in rebellion and Palestinian terrorists trying to blow up the peace process before it starts, some Labor heavyweights seem interested in rejoining the government. But party leader Amram Mitzna says the party can ensure a Knesset majority for the road map without entering the Cabinet. And, if Lieberman and Eitam bolt Sharon's coalition in protest against concessions to the Palestinians, Labor could always enter the Cabinet then.

But Lieberman and Eitam don't want to bolt the Cabinet in protest against the peace process; they want to use their place in the Cabinet to kill the peace process. And they could well succeed. The road map has little chance unless Yasir Arafat's would-be replacement, Prime Minister Abbas, grows far more powerful and popular among the Palestinians than he is now. And that won't happen unless he shows Palestinians he can materially improve their lives. If the Israeli Cabinet undermines Sharon's concessions at every turn—if Eitam's Housing Ministry creates facts on the ground that belie the prime minister's promises—the road map may continue on paper. But it will never produce a political dynamic that marginalizes Arafat and invests Abbas with the stature to convince Palestinians to accept the kind of deal they rejected at Camp David and Taba two and a half years ago. By the time Labor does join another national unity government, it may be too late.

Labor's final argument for remaining outside the government is that in opposition it can define itself. But define itself as what? When Sharon was expanding settlements and shunning negotiations, Labor could perhaps have claimed to represent a hardheaded alternative—a policy of crushing terrorism while also offering the Palestinians political hope. But now that appears to be the policy of Sharon. And, if Labor wants to make sure, all it has to do is offer the prime minister a simple trade: Eitam and Lieberman for us. After more than two years of almost nonstop Israeli and Palestinian slaughter, there is finally a chance to break the stalemate and end the carnage. And the important question is no longer "a Palestinian state—is that Eitam?" It is "a Palestinian state—is that Labor?"

PETER BEINART

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Open Door Policy

MANY HANDS HAVE been wrung and much ink has been spilled over the fact that, after eight weeks of occupation, the United States has turned up no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Some have taken this as proof that the Bush administration lied when it claimed that Saddam Hussein had WMD. But, while it now seems likely that the White House did overestimate—and overstate—the extent of Saddam's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, eight weeks is simply too soon to say that Saddam had no such capacity at all.

But eight weeks of occupation have proved more than enough time to reach another damning conclusion about the Bush administration and Iraq's WMD: The United States has done a terrible job securing known sites where WMD precursors were manufactured and stored. This failure has already allowed extremely dangerous material to fall into the hands of unknown, shadowy figures—precisely the outcome we fought this war to prevent.

Consider what transpired at the Al Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering Facility in Mosul. Al Kindi was no obscure site. Described by Saddam's regime as a missile research and development installation, Al Kindi was suspected by U.N. arms inspectors of being a home to Iraq's chemical and perhaps even nuclear programs. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency paid a visit to the facility within a month of returning to Iraq last fall.

Which is why American soldiers headed for Al Kindi after they took control of Mosul on April 13. But it is now clear that the 101st Airborne Division did not subject Al Kindi to a thorough inspection, nor did they fully secure the site. On May 9—nearly a month after entering Mosul—American forces found a tractor-trailer parked 50 feet outside Al Kindi's entrance. Last week, the CIA announced that it suspects the truck was a mobile biological weapons laboratory; the CIA also announced that the truck "appears to have been looted."

What happened at Al Kindi is part of a disastrous and underreported pattern. Take the debacle at the nuclear facility at Tuwaitha, southeast of Baghdad. In the 1990s, U.N. inspectors sealed more than two tons of enriched uranium and other radioactive materials from Tuwaitha in order to render the facility inactive. On the way to Baghdad, a detachment of American troops from the 3rd Infantry Division stopped at Tuwaitha to secure the site. But, even with soldiers from the 3rd I.D. guarding Tuwaitha, looters penetrated the site, ultimately taking at least at least 200 250-kilogram barrels of "yellow-cake" uranium, cesium, and cobalt—the latter two of which could be used to fashion dirty bombs.



Remarkably, the Bush administration doesn't even appear to be trying very hard to recover the looted uranium, cesium, and cobalt. American soldiers are merely conducting a "buyback" program, offering Iraqis the whopping sum of $3 per barrel of material. Not surprisingly, the buyback is failing to staunch proliferation of the deadly material. American forces have recovered only about 70 barrels—all of them empty.

Beyond Al Kindi and Tuwaitha, there are more than 600 potential WMD installations that American forces have not yet investigated or secured. That task falls to the recently created Iraq Survey Group, which is helmed by U.S. Army Major General Keith W. Dayton. Dayton's team replaces the previous unit in charge of the WMD hunt, the 75th Exploitation Task Force, but, while the Iraq Survey Group will have about 100 more on-scene searchers than its predecessor, those searchers must also investigate Iraqi war crimes, Saddam's potential links to terrorists, POW/MIA issues, and more. Little wonder then that, when a reporter asked last Friday if the Iraq Survey Group would visit all outstanding or unsecured installations, Dayton replied, "If [intelligence agents] say that site number three hundred fifty-three, based on everything we know now and based on ... other kinds of intelligence, that it's not a good place to go, then I'm not going to go there just because it's on a list."

Will Dayton's approach ultimately turn up WMD? It's possible. But it will not rule out the presence of WMD at other suspected sites, nor will it secure them—leaving the possibility that looters (or worse) will get their hands on yet more dangerous weapons. The Bush administration once upon a time argued that there was no margin for error when dealing with Iraq's WMD, famously stating that the smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud. It's at least eight weeks past time the administration started taking its own message to heart. ■

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NOTEBOOK

TORRICELLI CLEANS UP . . . TAUZIN RAKES IT IN . . . GRASSLEY TAKES ADVANTAGE

SPEAKING OF TOXIC WASTE...

THE LAST TIME WE HEARD FROM former New Jersey Senator Bob Torricelli, he was slinking away from Washington, having abandoned his re-election campaign under an ethical cloud. As he headed back to New Jersey and private life, Torricelli said he planned to work as a corporate consultant, develop affordable housing in inner cities, and write a book about ten turning points in the nation's history. He didn't mention anything about cashing in on the favors he did for people during his time in Congress.

Which is why we were shocked—shocked!—to learn last week that Torricelli has been appointed by federal Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh to serve as a special master overseeing the Honeywell company's court-ordered cleanup of a toxic-waste site in Jersey City. Cavanaugh, it turns out, is an old acquaintance of Torricelli: Not only did his wife contribute to Torricelli's campaigns and serve as finance director for Torricelli protégé Jon Corzine, Cavanaugh actually owes his seat on the U.S. District Court to Torricelli. In 2000, the Torch recommended Cavanaugh, then a federal magistrate judge, to President Bill Clinton for an appointment to the U.S. District Court. When Clinton sent Cavanaugh's nomination to the Senate, Torricelli again went to bat for Cavanaugh. "I have heard from the legal community, and actually the extraordinary step of current members of the federal judiciary, who have worked with Dennis Cavanaugh through the years and called to give their unequivocal support," Torricelli told his colleagues on the Senate Judiciary Committee.

And, if Torricelli's appointment by a crony to serve as special master doesn't already stink enough, it turns out that Torricelli also has a connection to Honeywell, the New Jersey–based company whose environmental cleanup work he will be supervising. Between 1998 and 2002, Honeywell's political action committee contributed $15,000 to Torricelli's campaign. Some attorneys have estimated that Honeywell's cleanup efforts will cost the company $400 million. But one of Torricelli's first tasks as special master will be to come up with the official estimate of what Honeywell will have to pay to decontaminate the Jersey City site. Of course, the toxic-waste cleanup isn't the only thing Honeywell will have to pay for: Under the court order, the company must also pay Torricelli for his services as special master. It's unclear just how much Torricelli will make—lawyers contacted by the *Newark Star Ledger* said, all told, it could be $500,000 or more. Who will determine Torricelli's fees? Why, Judge Cavanaugh, of course. Something tells us he'll be generous.



Bob Torricelli

THEIR MAN IN THE HOUSE

EVEN BEFORE MONDAY'S 3-2 VOTE by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ease media ownership restrictions, Congress was rising up in bipartisan mutiny. Countervailing legislation was introduced in both chambers weeks ago, and already 38 co-sponsors have jumped onto the House bill. Unfortunately, any congressional attempt to overturn the ruling must be approved by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which oversees the FCC and happens to be chaired by none other than Louisiana Republican W.J. "Billy" Tauzin. As this magazine has noted in the past (see Peter Beinart, "Accounting," February 11, 2002), perhaps no member of Congress operates with fewer scruples than Tauzin. Throughout the past decade, the boy from the bayou has become the consummate industry lackey. In last year's election cycle, Tauzin ranked among the top five House beneficiaries in twelve major sectors, including tobacco, pharmaceutical and health products, chemicals, auto dealers, oil and gas, and electric utilities, among others. More important for the current debate, according to data from the Center for Responsive Politics, Tauzin has received more than $100,000 from the commercial TV and radio industries since 1989, more money than anyone else in the House. That figure includes hefty donations from Fox parent group News Corp, an aggressive proponent of the FCC action. Since 2000, Tauzin has accepted an additional $60,000 from cable TV firms, a sizable chunk of which came from media behemoth Viacom, which—surprise!—also stands to profit dramatically from the FCC's ownership-cap increase. And the industry has showered Tauzin with more than just cash. A 2000 report from the Center for Public Integrity revealed that media companies have treated Tauzin and his senior staff to at least 42 trips—one out of every eight that the industry sponsors—a rate, again, higher than any other member of Congress. Tauzin toted his wife on one of

DAVID COWLES

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the more extravagant junkets, a six-day, $18,910 e-commerce "conference" in Paris financed by Time Warner and Instinet. So, even if Congress is spoiling for a fight, with Tauzin at the helm of the Commerce Committee, media giants know they can breathe easy. "At the end of the day," explained Tauzin's spokesman, Ken Johnson, this week, "there's going to be a lot of shouting about the [FCC] decision but not much shooting." Translation: Billy Tauzin has made his bed and is more than happy to let Rupert Murdoch lie in it.

POOR TAX

NO SOONER HAD PRESIDENT BUSH signed his latest tax cut than Republicans came under attack for what it left out: a provision that would have expanded the number of families eligible for child-tax-credit refunds. GOP leaders stripped this provision—which would apply to twelve million poor children—out of the final bill in an effort to limit its ten-year cost to $350 billion. This, despite the fact that the provision would cost a mere $3.5 billion, or 1 percent of the total tax cut.

Not to fear, though: Iowa Republican and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles Grassley has proposed legislation to rectify the situation. But there's a catch: Grassley's bill would cost $90 billion over the next ten years, or 25 times the cost of the expansion for poor families. Why is this? Because, in addition to ensuring that low-income workers get the child-tax break, it also undoes one of the ridiculous gimmicks that Republicans used to keep the cost of the last tax cut to $350 billion. The bill signed by Bush increased the child-tax credit—most of which goes to middle-income taxpayers—from $600 to $1,000 per child per year, but only for two years, after which it will drop back to $600. As Jonathan Chait pointed out in his cover story two weeks ago ("Race to the Bottom"), the GOP has fallen in love with such tax-cut tricks for two reasons: Not only do they allow them to claim their cuts will cost much less than they almost certainly will, they also create absurdities (such as the early sunset of the child-tax-credit increase) that then require fixing by further tax cuts. But even we didn't imagine that the Republicans would start fixing the last tax cut this quickly—or under cover of helping poor families. "Maybe I'm trying to take advantage of a political uproar to get as much permanence as I can and be as expansive as I can," Grassley said of his legislation. Yeah, maybe.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

THE PHOTO CREDIT FOR THE COVER of our May 26 issue was incorrect. It should have been AP/Worldwide. We regret the error. ■

Inside the Box | Bruce Reed

WHERE'S WALDO? Bush says tractor-trailers prove we've found weapons of mass destruction. Next discovery: a boat that might have been Noah's Ark.

DEER HUNTER American troops hunt and barbeque Saddam's gazelles. New U.S. rationale for war: "We had to put food on the table."

CUT AND RUN White House refutes Treasury study projecting $44 trillion in future deficits. Ari's defense: "We wrote language into the tax bill so the nation sunsets in 2008."

FLEISCHER: GETTY; COMBS: KRT

SCROOGED Final tax bill takes away child credit from millions of low-wage families. Representative Thomas: "But, if they sell their kids, the gain is tax-free!"

BAD BOY Business partner says Sean "P. Diddy" Combs is eyeing public office in New York: "He can run on his record—it's long enough!"

STORY HOUR Bush lets visiting foreign leaders hear his daily intelligence briefings: "They fall for it every time!"

BENCH JOCKEYS Rehnquist says that over the long term, low pay may destroy quality and independence of federal judiciary. White House Counsel Gonzales: "It would be quicker to just confirm all our nominees."

GENDER GAP Idaho scientist clones mule from fetus of female horse and male donkey. Democratic pollster Mark Penn: "With Bush's numbers so high, there are no male donkeys."

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

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Campaign Journal

Identity Theft

BY RYAN LIZZA

HOWARD DEAN HAS called John Kerry many nasty things, but this past weekend Dean took his verbal assault to a new level: He called Kerry a crook. Speaking at a Democratic forum in upstate New York shortly after Kerry had addressed the same group, Dean complained that Kerry had ripped him off. "I heard he did a great job giving my speech," Dean griped before speaking to the 1,000 or so Democrats who had come to hear the presidential candidates' views on rural issues. "I appreciate Senator Kerry saying we don't need Bush Lite, and we don't," Dean then told the crowd. "But, Senator Kerry, we don't want Dean Lite, either."

Dean's comments made headlines, but he is not the only Democratic candidate accusing his rivals of being copycats. Indeed, the most common complaint coming from the Democratic presidential campaigns these days is "stop, thief." As the nine candidates try to carve out unique identities for themselves, each is becoming increasingly territorial about any idea, proposal, applause line, or other aspect of his campaign he believes is distinctively his own. All of the griping—some of it legitimate, a lot of it ridiculous—points to just how hard it is for the candidates to distinguish themselves in a crowded field. It also raises the question: How many big new Democratic ideas are there, anyway?

Each campaign has its particular set of complaints. As Dick Gephardt's aides watch the primary of ideas unfold, they swear they see their boss's rhetoric and proposals everywhere. A year and a half ago, Gephardt, consciously echoing President Kennedy's call to put a man on the moon, proposed an Apollo Project to put the nation on the road to energy independence. Kerry liked that analogy, too. "[W]hy not go to the moon right here on Earth," the Massachusetts senator asked in an April speech, "by declaring that we will be energy independent by a certain time in the United States of America." Meanwhile, Joe Lieberman also declared that the United States needs energy independence, and he called for a "Manhattan Project" to achieve it.

Gephardt aides also charge that their candidate's health care ideas are being pilfered. After Gephardt framed the debate over his expensive health care plan as a fight pitting health care versus tax cuts, Kerry seemed to jump on the bandwagon, selling his own health care plan as a stark choice between "tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans or health care for all Americans." "Kerry never said that before," complains a Gephardt aide. Hmm. But wasn't *Dean* talking about such a choice last year when Gephardt was still mum on repealing the Bush tax cuts? True enough, a Gephardt aide concedes: "We're one party, and there are only so many ideas. ... It's kind of silly to say someone owns this whole [health care] idea." But, while on the subject, the aide can't help but point out that last week Dean adopted the Gephardt view that *all* the Bush tax cuts must be repealed. "He was critical of Gephardt's position, and now he's adopted it," says the aide.

In the Edwards camp, jaws hit the floor almost every time they hear Kerry unveil a new policy. When the Massachusetts senator proposed two new community-service initiatives two weeks ago, aides to Edwards privately grumbled that they were strikingly similar to two recent Edwards proposals, one that encourages community service for high school students and another—"College for Everyone"—that helps students pay for the first year of college. Other recent Kerry proposals also look suspiciously familiar to members of Edwards's policy team. When they examine the details of Kerry's plan to reform medical malpractice and his idea to increase access to prescription drugs, aides to Edwards see their boss's handiwork. Last fall, Edwards proposed a new Homeland Intelligence Agency. In March, Kerry called for a new domestic intelligence unit. A month after Edwards introduced legislation to transform neighborhood watches into civil defense networks, Kerry proposed a "new Community Defense Service," which does the same thing.

Undoubtedly, the most unusual allegation of political identity theft comes from Bob Graham's campaign. Nothing is more closely associated with the Florida senator than his habit of keeping detailed notes of his life in pocket notebooks—something he's been doing for 26 years. Last month, Lieberman's campaign unveiled a new blog on which the Connecticut senator posts mundane details of his travels. "Lieberman is now imitating Graham's diaries!" charges Graham's press secretary, Jamal Simmons. "It's amazing. Lieberman can do this on his website, and no one has anything to say. ... The double standard is appalling."

BUT NO CAMPAIGN has been more protective—some might say paranoid—about its candidate's identity than Dean's. Dean's aides see thieves everywhere. "Just about anything you can think of" has been stolen from the former Vermont governor, according to Dean campaign manager Joe Trippi. Trippi complains that Kerry took Dean's health care plan. "Our plan shows up as the Kerry plan with some minor differences," he alleges. Edwards has ripped off Dean's use of the word "backbone"—as in, Democrats need to show some. "Edwards stole that one," Trippi says. Several candidates have come out for civil unions since Dean started talking about the issue, and, according to Trippi, Gephardt has appropriated Dean's formulation for talking about health care and the Bush tax cuts (the same formulation Gephardt's people say Kerry stole from them). "You al-

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

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most don't want to put out your economic plan for fear that, within a few days, everyone will have carved it up and moved on with it," says Trippi. "This is a new level of grand-theft politics. What's great is how they say we're unelectable, but then they steal all our stuff."

Dean is almost irrationally protective of "Bush Lite." Indeed, several weeks before Dean blasted Kerry, Dean's aides went after Gephardt for using the term. But, this week, alerted to the fact that Dean's campaign had accused their man of stealing Dean's supposedly trademarked expression, the Gephardt campaign quickly responded with a "Brief History of 'Bush Lite,'" a paper documenting 15 years of the term's use, from its origins as a reference to Dan Quayle in the late '80s to its emergence as a description of Bill Clinton's early foreign policy to its widespread application as a derogatory moniker for George W. Bush during his 1994 gubernatorial campaign. As recently as 2000, according to the Gephardt study, the term was being used in the same context in which Dean now uses it: "The first modern documentation of a Democrat being considered 'Bush Lite'" occurred in 2000 when someone hurled the epithet at Al Gore, the Gephardt report states. "When will [Dean] file the lawsuit against Bud and Miller?" asks Gephardt's spokesman, Erik Smith.

The origins of other Dean lines are murkier. Take the debate over "backbone." Trippi says Edwards stole Dean's use of the word. In late April, Dean did make a widely reported remark that Democratic leaders need a "backbone transplant." Yet the record shows an Edwardsian usage way back in February. "We need to have the backbone and courage," he told a meeting of Democrats in Washington that month, "to say that we will not let John Ashcroft, in the name of the war on terrorism, take away our rights, take away our freedom, [and] take away our liberties!" (Newspaper-database searches confirm that other candidates have also used the word since its fourteenth-century coinage.)

But even Dean isn't immune to charges of thievery. Other campaigns point out he regularly uses Paul Wellstone's famous line—"I'm here to represent the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party"—without crediting the late senator. The Kerry campaign has complained that Dean ripped off their man's line about Bush's prescription for the economy: "Take two tax cuts, and call me in the morning." LexisNexis shows Kerry with the earliest recorded usage on May 16, and Dean is suspiciously quoted using the line the very next day. Trippi's defense of Dean rests on the logic that only a physician could have thought up such a medical reference. "Let's see: one doctor, an ambassador, a reverend, two congressmen, and four senators," Trippi says in an e-mail, ticking off each of the Democratic candidates' livelihoods. "And we have to guess who came up with that one?"

Luckily, the campaigns have found an upside to such rampant kleptomania. If they're a victim of it, it must mean they're doing something right. "Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery," says Trippi. Adds Simmons, Graham's press secretary, "Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery." ■

La Sierra Dispatch

The Right Man

BY RACHEL VAN DONGEN

NESTLED HIGH AMONG the mountains of Cauca, a coca-producing region in southern Colombia, La Sierra is one of those forgotten villages Colombians call ghost towns. For at least two years, it was governed by the leftist rebels known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But, on March 5, 2003, a band of 36 *soldados campesinos,* or peasant soldiers—ordinary Colombians who train for three months in urban warfare under a new government program and then return home—marched into town and took over. According to surprised residents, the FARC abruptly left. "The guerrillas were here before," confided Aurelio Trujillo, a barefoot worker at the town's "Indian Store." "They haven't come back."

La Sierra may seem trivial in the context of Colombia's four-decade civil conflict against drugs and terror. But it represents a sea change that began with the election of hardline President Alvaro Uribe Vélez in May 2002. Backed by U.S. money and utilizing aggressive new counterterror and counter-narcotics strategies, Uribe is starting to gain the upper hand against rebels and drugs, a battle some observers said could never be won. In fact, Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos testified before Congress this week that coca and poppy crops would be eliminated by the time Uribe's term ends in 2006.

A central element of "Plan Colombia," the joint U.S.-Colombian anti-drug effort launched in 2000 and embraced by Uribe, has been the destruction of the country's coca crops, which provide the precursors for 80 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States. Under Uribe's predecessor, Andrés Pastrana, the United States was only allowed to fumigate in certain proscribed areas since Pastrana did not want to offend the FARC, with whom he was negotiating a landmark peace deal that ultimately failed. In fact, Pastrana gave the FARC a so-called safe haven the size of Switzerland, which even the Colombian military was not allowed to enter. In Putumayo, an area bordering the safe haven where the bulk of Colombia's coca crops are grown, Pastrana permitted intermittent, and ineffective, fumigation. According to an American Embassy official, fumigation began in Putumayo in December 2000 only to stop again in March 2001. It resumed in November 2001, was suspended in March 2002, and finally started again in July 2002. The result: From 2000 to 2001, coca crops expanded in the safe-haven area from

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32,200 to 40,300 hectares. In Putumayo, they declined a mere 5,400 hectares, from 47,400 to 42,000.

Under Uribe, the situation has changed dramatically. The new president has allowed American contractors in Colombia to fumigate coca crops across the country for the first time. The widespread fumigation is working. Last year, Colombia's coca production fell for the first time in a decade. In Putumayo, according to U.S. estimates, coca crops were reduced from 42,000 to 8,200 hectares. In the former safe-haven area, they declined from 40,300 to 32,350. Even the United Nations, which does not participate in fumigation efforts, credited the U.S. spray program as a main reason for the drop in coca crops in 2002. One American official estimates that, by 2005, fumigation will have reduced Colombia's coca crops to less than one-fourth the acreage planted in 2000.

And the U.S. spray program comes with a surprisingly low price tag. Since the launch of Plan Colombia, the United States has spent a mere $83 million on spray planes, chemicals, pilot salaries, the training of Colombian pilots, and other contractor expenses.

Some critics of Plan Colombia warn that fumigation will only lead to increased coca growing elsewhere in the region. "I don't share the warm and fuzzy view that we're on our way to salvation here," says Massachusetts Democratic Representative Jim McGovern, who sponsored an amendment to eliminate $61 million of the $105 million in aid provided to Colombia in the fiscal 2003 supplemental bill. "You can fumigate all of Colombia if you want, you can fumigate all of Peru, then you can fumigate all of Bolivia, but coca production won't stop." But McGovern may be wrong. While coca-growing may temporarily increase among Colombia's neighbors, fumigation has in the past proved effective in countries such as Peru and Bolivia, which do not have large armed militias supporting the drug industry. As Colombian production drops and the United States and Colombia take the fight to the FARC and other groups, the capacity of the main drug-producing country in the region will be decimated, and handling production in smaller neighboring countries will be much easier.

WIPING OUT THE armed militias is hardly an easy task, but the United States and Colombia must do so to win the drug war. The FARC and their nemesis, the right-wing paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, known by their Spanish acronym AUC, are the drug trade's main protectors. Without the militias' muscle and networks, coca growers and traffickers would be much more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts. Indeed, as documents recently seized by the Colombian military show, the FARC and other militias essentially have become the drug lords themselves.

In an abrupt change from Pastrana's failed peace effort, Uribe has stepped up the Colombian military's attacks on the FARC. Sporadic state government has long been a problem in some regions of Colombia, where the weak rule of law has helped foster the rise of armed groups. But, now, Uribe is aiming to station troops in all of Colombia's 1,098 municipalities by filling the army's ranks through the peasant-soldier initiative, by imposing a war tax of 1.2 percent on the rich to pay for military programs, and by proposing to extend mandatory military service to the sons of the wealthy, who have long evaded it. Through these measures, Uribe has promised to increase the army from 60,000 to 100,000 troops.

Uribe's government is also using new tactics to convince the rebels to surrender. It has launched a series of radio broadcasts designed to inform both rebels and paramilitary members of the atrocities their groups have committed and to advertise how much better life is among legal society.

Uribe also has benefited from increased U.S. counter-guerrilla aid, which comes on top of the counter-narcotics aid in place since 2000; in March, Congress passed legislation allowing the United States to help fund Colombia's war effort. U.S. aid has gone toward training Colombian troops in counter-guerrilla warfare and in protecting such institutions as the Caño-Limon oil pipeline in troubled Arauca state. In 2001, the FARC and other rebels bombed the pipeline a whopping 170 times, costing the Colombian government $500 million in lost revenue. As part of the aid approved in March, the United States also pledged resources to help decapitate the AUC and to protect Uribe, who has been the subject of several assassination attempts by the FARC.

Although he has yet to achieve a major military victory, Uribe has put the militias on the defensive. According to the Colombian Defense Ministry, between August 2002 (when Uribe was inaugurated) and March 2003, the government has captured 3,217 members of the FARC and the National Liberation Army, another guerrilla group, a 128 percent increase from the year before. It has nabbed 1,237 AUC members, a 98 percent increase since last year. Meanwhile, since January 2003, when Green Berets arrived to train Colombian troops stationed near the Caño-Limon pipeline in counterterror tactics, the pipeline has been bombed less often. And, largely because of the government's program to boost desertions, there has been a 40 percent rise in rebel desertions since 2001.

Still, skeptics are not convinced that the drug war is winnable in Colombia. "Security is not just the fear of being attacked by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. Security is the fear the mothers and fathers have of being able to feed their kids," says McGovern. He's right. But, for the townspeople of La Sierra, any government presence is a ray of hope, and any gains in the war on drugs mean a great deal. "The town is calm," Trujillo says simply. "It is very different." ■

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Is Rehnquist a feminist?

Sister Act

BY JEFFREY ROSEN

WILLIAM REHNQUIST HASN'T always been a crusader for women's rights. As President Richard Nixon's assistant attorney general in 1970, he wrote an internal Justice Department memo charging that the Equal Rights Amendment threatened to transform "holy wedlock" into "holy deadlock." "I cannot help thinking that there is also present somewhere within [the ERA movement] a virtually fanatical desire to obscure not only legal differentiation between men and women, but insofar as possible, physical distinctions between the sexes," he continued. "I think there are overtones of dislike and distaste for the traditional difference between men and women in the family unit."

Last week, however, in his 6-3 opinion holding that individuals can sue states for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act, the chief justice seemed to be channeling Betty Friedan. "Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men," Rehnquist wrote in *Nevada* v. *Hibbs*. "These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about women's commitment to work and their value as employees."

Reluctant to believe that Rehnquist has evolved into an avatar of second-wave feminism, some observers are speculating that he is on the verge of retiring from the Supreme Court and is therefore reluctant to have one of his final acts be a ruling that would make it impossible for individuals to sue states for violating such a popular law. Or perhaps he adopted the crowd-pleasing stance because he knew it would carry the day regardless of his vote. "Rehnquist was willing to be the sixth vote, but it's not clear that he would have been the fifth," says Akhil Amar of Yale Law School. "Maybe he's smoothing the waters for the confirmation hearings of his successor" by not putting the Court on a collision course with the women's movement.

But there is a less Machiavellian explanation for Rehnquist's opinion. Far from showing a new appreciation of feminist theory, Rehnquist's opinion is the latest assertion of the judicial supremacy that represents his most important legacy. Central to it is the extravagant claim that Congress may only allow individuals to sue states for engaging in those forms of discrimination that the Court itself has already identified as unconstitutional—in the case of the Family and Medical Leave Act, gender discrimination. In addition to being self-aggrandizing in the extreme, this theory is impossible to reconcile with the recent legal history of gender discrimination in the United States. Since the '70s, Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, has embraced an increasingly expansive conception of equal citizenship for women; the Court has reluctantly followed in Congress's footsteps. By now suggesting that Congress may not define discrimination more broadly than the Court, Rehnquist is turning history on its head in an attempt to assert the Court's exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution.

THE *HIBBS* OPINION seems anomalous on the surface: In a series of recent cases, Rehnquist has held that Congress may not allow individuals to sue the states for discriminating on the basis of age and disability because the Court had not identified these forms of discrimination as unconstitutional before Congress acted. "[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees," Rehnquist wrote in *Hibbs*. In other words, while the Court's recent tendency to strike down federal laws is generally justified in the name of federalism—as a way of preventing Congress from encroaching on the authority of the states—it is just as concerned about the separation of powers—as a way of preventing Congress from encroaching on the authority of the Court. As in the earlier cases overturning federal laws, the *Hibbs* case offered Rehnquist an opportunity to argue that Congress may not define constitutional rights more broadly than the Supreme Court and may only hold the states liable for forms of discrimination that the Supreme Court has identified in advance as unconstitutional.

The most respected legal historians on the left and right have argued that Rehnquist's vision of judicial supremacy is historically incoherent. From the founding until the Civil War, as Amar notes, the Court invalidated only two federal laws, but presidents vetoed roughly two dozen laws on constitutional grounds. And, as Michael McConnell, a recent Bush appointee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, has demonstrated, the framers of the Civil War amendments expected Congress, rather than the Court, to take the lead in defining illegal discrimination. But Rehnquist's vision of judicial supremacy is rooted less in original understanding than in self-preservation: Allowing Congress to define constitutional rights, he has held repeatedly, would threaten the Court's exclusive authority.

Viewed in this light, the recent decision on the Family and Medical Leave Act represents not a retreat by Rehnquist as much as a defiant reaffirmation of judicial supremacy. Congress was free to hold the states liable for gender discrimination in 1993, Rehnquist held, because the Supreme Court had already made clear in 1976 that gender discrimination violates the Constitution. (Rehnquist himself angrily dissented from that decision, but never mind.) That is to say, Congress was allowed to prohibit the states from discriminating on the basis of sex only because the

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Supreme Court had done so first. But, as Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel argue in a forthcoming article in *The Yale Law Journal*, the opposite is true: In the '70s, the second-wave feminist movement argued that women could be equal to men only if the family was reformed in ways that allowed men and women to participate equally at work. Congress responded to these claims by passing the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972. After the Supreme Court held that discrimination against pregnant women didn't violate the Constitution, Congress responded by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which holds that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of illegal sex discrimination. Indeed, it wasn't until after Congress passed a series of laws vindicating the feminists' vision of gender equality that the Court changed its mind and concluded that gender discrimination is almost as constitutionally troubling as race discrimination. If Rehnquist acknowledged this recent history, he would be hard-pressed to uphold the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, in which Congress explicitly defined discrimination more expansively than the Court.

IF REHNQUIST UPHELD the Family and Medical Leave Act as a way of reasserting judicial authority, the dissenting votes of his conservative colleagues in the *Hibbs* case represent an even more assertive defense of states' rights. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for himself, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas, argues, "The Eleventh Amendment ... protects a State's fiscal integrity from federal intrusion by vesting the States with immunity from private actions for damages pursuant to federal laws. ... [W]hen Congress couples the entitlement with the authorization to sue the States for monetary damages, it blurs the line of accountability the State has to its own citizens." Kennedy's logic, like his prose, is hard to follow: The Eleventh Amendment prohibits states from being sued by citizens of other states, while Hibbs, a Nevada citizen, was suing his own state. (So much for fidelity to the text of the Constitution.) And, under Kennedy's reasoning, even though individuals may not sue their own states for illegal discrimination, the federal government remains free to sue the state on the individual's behalf or to withhold funds from the state unless it agrees to regulations that the federal government specifies. Surely these forms of indirect federal coercion blur the lines of accountability between states and their citizens more dramatically than allowing citizens to sue their own states for illegal discrimination.

The reason Congress hasn't yet complained much about the Supreme Court's assault on its prerogatives is that the practical effects of the Court's federalism decisions are, for the moment, minimal. The Court has struck down technical provisions of obscure laws passed by the pre–Newt Gingrich Congresses of the Clinton era in ways that affect few Americans in the short term. But the *Hibbs* decision is one of a series of Supreme Court precedents that are quietly handcuffing the power of Congress to interpret the Constitution more expansively than the Court. When, five or ten or twenty years from now, a more liberal Congress decides to create a series of new anti-discrimination rights (paid family leave, for example) in a way that strikes the conservative justices as going beyond what the Constitution requires, we may see a showdown between the Court and Congress that makes the New Deal crisis—in which Congress rebelled against the Court's attacks on its authority—look tame by comparison. And, by suggesting that the Court, rather than Congress, has historically taken the lead in defining constitutional rights in the United States, the conservatives have done more than rewrite history. They have morphed into mirror images of the Warren Court justices they used to attack. Wasn't the conservative judicial revolution based on the claim that political battles should be settled by Congress rather than the courts? ■

Europe's mighty economy.

Juggernaut

BY PHILIPPE LEGRAIN

THE BUBBLE MAY have burst, but the hubris lives on. Despite Bush administration concerns, expressed at the G-8 summit of leading industrialized countries this week, that economic weakness is spreading throughout the globe, Americans still routinely boast that their economy beats the socks off the rest of the world. Japan? A write-off. Europe? A basket case. China? A threat, perhaps, but still a distant one. While others stumble along, the United States races ahead. After all, President Bush never ceases to reassure Americans that "the U.S. economy is the strongest and most resilient economy in the world."

To be sure, even Panglossians concede that the U.S. economy has had a few problems of late: the odd multibillion-dollar bankruptcy, a significant decline in stock prices, even a mild recession. But such hiccups, we are assured, are transitory. America's economy is fundamentally sound. Money is cheap, consumers continue to indulge, and more tax cuts are in the pipeline. Supercharged, productivity-led growth will soon resume. Europe's condition, by contrast, seems chronic. Weighed down by high taxes, throttled by endless red tape, held back by inept policymakers, it staggers lamely on. Only 18 months ago, crow American officials and businessmen, all the talk was that 2002 would be Europe's year,

Philippe Legrain is chief economist of Britain in Europe, the campaign for Britain to join the euro. His book, OPEN WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBALIZATION *(Ivan R. Dee), is forthcoming in the United States and was published last year in the United Kingdom by Abacus.*

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Kurt M. Landgraf,
President & CEO of
Educational Testing Service

"If we want a world-class teaching force, we must build a world-class system to train and retain highly qualified teachers."

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Common sense and research tell us that teachers are the single biggest influence on how well children learn. So it's no surprise the discussion and debate about reforming our schools is zeroing in on the quality of teaching in our classrooms.

Congress began taking a closer look at how our teachers are prepared and certified during the 1998 Higher Education Act (HEA) reauthorization. This effort intensified with the "highly-qualified" teacher provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act and will most certainly continue during the upcoming HEA reauthorization.

We know many loud voices with differing opinions are talking about teacher quality. We also know many of these voices will offer a myriad of false choices and simple solutions. But common sense and research tell us there are no silver bullets.

ETS has long been engaged in efforts to measure and improve teacher quality. This is evident in the policies we advocate and the products and services we provide. We're listening to the public and learning from research what it means to be a truly effective teacher. We're eager to partner with parents, teachers and policymakers in leading the way to help attract, develop and retain the best teacher workforce possible.

Data on the current teaching force gives us a classic good news/bad news scenario. Of the 3 million teachers in the U.S., almost all have college degrees and half have graduate degrees. A growing body of research shows the positive impact of good teachers and high quality professional development on our schools—that's good news.

However, there is increasing evidence that too many teachers have assignments that don't match their qualifications. Almost 30 percent of our secondary school math teachers are not fully certified to teach math. And many student teachers do not meet high standards in core academic subjects.

In an ETS commissioned national survey on teacher quality, conducted by the bi-partisan team of Peter Hart and Robert Teeter, we learned that Americans have a multi-faceted definition of teacher quality: it's not just about what teachers know, but how well they convey that knowledge to students.

ETS will soon release a new report that examines how teachers are prepared in the U.S. and in seven countries (Australia, England, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and Singapore) whose students performed as well as or better than ours in math and science assessments. In these countries, teachers are members of a vigorously regulated profession with a highly centralized system of teacher education and certification. Compared to the U.S., these countries use more filters to govern the flow of prospective teachers and utilize more high-stakes filters throughout a teacher's career.

All these research studies remind us there are no simple solutions. If we want a world-class teaching force, we must work together to build a world-class system to train and retain highly qualified teachers. We must not only set high standards, but also help students and teachers meet them.

We invite you to continue this dialogue by sharing your thoughts and questions at www.ets.org/testing or by mail.

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as the benefits of the euro took hold—yet, once again, the U.S. economy outperformed its Atlantic competitors.

The lesson could not be clearer. America's economic model is triumphant. Government is the problem, not the solution. Markets know best. The rest of the world must adopt American-style capitalism or face inevitable decline. Bush administration officials, from the president on down, hold this as an article of faith. Even liberal pundits seem convinced. As Thomas Friedman, the globe-trotting foreign affairs columnist for *The New York Times*, put it in his inimitable faux-naïf way in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, "Through the process of globalization everyone is forced toward America's gas station. If you are not an American and don't know how to pump your own gas, I suggest you learn."

Pause for a second. Allow some awkward facts to intrude. Which economy has performed better in recent years—Europe's or America's? Surprise: According to the International Monetary Fund, an institution more often accused of imposing Washington's ways than of knocking them, Europe's has. Over the past three years, living standards, as measured by GDP per person, have risen by 5.8 percent in the European Union but by only 1 percent in the United States. An unfair comparison, perhaps, given America's recent recession? Then look at how the European Union and the United States size up since 1995, a period that includes the go-go late '90s, when America apparently advanced by leaps and bounds. While living standards in the United States have risen by a healthy 16.1 percent over the past eight years, they are up by 18.3 percent in the European Union. Another statistical sleight of hand? Not at all. Pick any year between 1995 and 2000 as your starting point, and the conclusion is the same: Europe's economy has outperformed America's.

To be fair, on a different measure, the United States has outpaced Europe. Its economy has grown by an average of 3.2 percent per year since 1995, whereas Europe's economy has swelled by only 2.3 percent. These headline figures transfix pundits and policymakers alike. But this apparent success is deceptive. Not only are U.S. growth figures inflated because American number-crunchers have done more than their European counterparts to take into account improvements in the quality of goods and services, but America's population is also growing much faster than Europe's. It has increased by nearly one-tenth in the past eight years, whereas Europe's population has scarcely grown at all. So, although America's pie is growing faster than Europe's, so too is the number of mouths it has to feed. Most people, though, care about higher living standards, not higher economic growth. If size were all that mattered, the United States could simply annex Canada and, presto, its economy would be larger, whether people in Peoria felt any better or not.

U.S. economic triumphalism is based on more than just GDP growth, of course. Boosters claim that it has enjoyed markedly faster productivity growth, too. Really? It is tough enough to measure how fast productivity is growing in the United States—remember all those wrangles about whether the step up in productivity in the late '90s was a giant leap, a modest bounce, or an illusion. International comparisons are harder still. Even so, the Conference Board, a New York–based business-research group that is hardly a fan of European ways, has taken a stab at it. Their figures show that, although the average U.S. labor-productivity growth of 1.9 percent per year since 1995 exceeds the EU average of 1.3 percent, five individual European countries have done better than the United States. Belgium managed 2.2 percent per year, Austria 2.4 percent, Finland 2.6 percent, Greece 3.2 percent, and Ireland 5.1 percent. If you take a longer time span, 1990 to 2002, not only does the European Union as a whole outpace the United States, so do ten of the 14 individual EU member states for which statistics are available. (The Conference Board does not include figures for Luxembourg.)

Not only is productivity growth higher in several European countries than in the United States—so too are absolute productivity levels. The average American produces $38.83 of output per hour, measured in 1999 dollars, according to the Conference Board. Average productivity in the European Union is still 8 percent less, largely because of lower productivity in Britain, Spain, Greece, and Portugal—although the gap has closed over the past decade. But six European countries have overtaken the United States: Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Belgium, and Norway, where output per hour is $45.55, over one-sixth higher than in the United States.

Advocates of U.S. ways could point out—correctly—that, even though those six European countries enjoy higher average productivity levels than the United States, they still have lower output per person. One reason is that less of the population works, by choice or because of higher unemployment, in each of those countries except Norway and the Netherlands. But the main reason is that Europeans work shorter hours. In some cases, they may be compelled to do so by law: In France, for instance, legislation limits many employees' working weeks to 35 hours. But, typically, they choose to do so. Whereas American workers toil ever longer hours, Europeans prefer to take more time off as they get richer. Working more to earn more is a perfectly valid lifestyle choice. But one should not conclude that Americans' higher output is a result of their greater efficiency, when it mostly reflects greater toil.

Where the U.S. economy is really said to come into its own, though, is in its ability to create jobs. Many of them may be low-paying—indeed, America's minimum-wage workers typically earn less than Germans receive in unemployment benefits—but at least the United States does not suffer the scourge of mass unemployment that Europe does. Yet Europe is not the unemployment black hole it is made out to be. Although joblessness is shockingly high in some countries, it is lower in others—lower even than in the United States in seven of the 15 countries that make up the European Union.

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Freddie Mac on the secondary mortgage market.

The unsung hero of American public policy.



It may not be as well-known as Social Security, Head Start or the National Institutes of Health, but the secondary mortgage market is every bit as successful. Since 1970, it's helped 33 million hardworking families become homeowners and made the American home financing system the envy of the world. The secondary mortgage market is where lenders get funds they use for home mortgages. They sell the mortgages to companies like Freddie Mac, and we, in turn, package them into securities and sell them to investors. The best part is, everybody wins. The borrower gets a home of his own with affordable monthly payments, the lender gets more customers and the investor gets a reliable, consistent return. All at no cost to the taxpayer. It's a system that works for everyone. You can't get more American than that. To learn more about our role, visit freddiemac.com/secmarket.

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THE MYTH OF U.S. economic exceptionalism warps expectations of the future as well. Most American economists, including members of the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, think prospects for the U.S. economy over the next few years are brighter than Europe's. But there is good reason to believe they will be proved wrong. Why? Because, while Americans harp on about Europe's structural problems, they turn a blind eye to the unsustainable imbalances in their own economy.

There is no denying that Europe has its problems. It is in a cyclical funk. Its biggest economy, Germany, is still struggling with the burden of reunification—which eats up 5 percent of national income each year—and is weighed down by outdated labor restrictions. Although European leaders vowed at their summit in Lisbon in March 2000 to make the European Union the world's most competitive and dynamic economy by 2010, many of the key reforms they announced are still on paper, waiting to be approved.

But none of this means Europe is a basket case. A cyclical downturn does not imply long-term decline. Germany, remember, still has higher productivity levels than the United States. Although the Lisbon process is depressingly incomplete, the ultimate destination is not in doubt.

Nor are Europe's more stringent labor-market regulations (which vary widely from country to country) as great a hindrance to growth as they are made out to be. Of course, some may reduce productivity. They certainly impose social costs on people needlessly made redundant. If they raise the cost of hiring workers, companies have to recoup this higher cost by driving workers harder or holding down their wages. But, once this one-off adjustment has been made and companies' profitability is restored, that's it. Just as a one-off hike in sales tax may dent consumption but would not cause a downward spiral in consumer spending, so too tougher labor-market regulations do not cause the economy to continue going down the tubes, since companies respond.

Admittedly, rigid laws can also make it harder for an economy to cope with change. If they impede declining industries from shedding workers, they may slow the growth of expanding ones—and thus the growth of the economy as a whole. But, even though this loss of flexibility may ratchet up unemployment and slow economic growth somewhat, it is not the downward spiral critics fear.

After all, Europe's strict labor laws have existed for years. Despite them, as we have seen, many European economies have outperformed America's. What's more, they are being reformed. The German government has announced ambitious plans to loosen job protection and cut unemployment benefits. France, Spain, and Italy have all made part-time work much easier. Why, then, given the changes in the works, should these regulations suddenly condemn Europe to stagnation over the next few years?

Europe's higher taxes also are not as big a burden as they are made out to be. Undeniably, at some point, taxes get so high that they dampen economic growth. But it should be obvious that, if taxes are spent well, they can boost an economy's productivity. Well-educated, healthy workers—and trains that get them to work on time—are pluses. Fans of small government point out that Ireland's low-tax economy has grown the fastest in Europe since 1995 and Germany's high-tax economy the slowest. But Finland, whose government takes half its citizens' incomes in tax (far more than Germany's does) comes in just behind Ireland (and Luxembourg) in the growth-league table—and far ahead of the United States. Another relatively low-tax economy, Britain, came in ninth out of the EU's 15 countries. Look again at the list of five countries that have notched up faster productivity growth than the United States since 1995: Belgium, Austria, Finland, Greece, and Ireland. Consider the six that have higher productivity levels: Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Belgium, and Norway. Only Ireland is a low-tax economy.

The truth about Europe is that its weaknesses are not as big as they seem—and its advantages are underplayed. Obscured by all the cyclical gloom, Europe's new common currency, the euro, is already working its magic. Soaring cross-border trade and investment within the euro-zone are melding individual economies into one. Germany trades one-sixth more of its economy with its European partners than it did before the euro's launch in 1999; France, one-eighth more. Cross-border investment within the euro-zone quadrupled in the first two years of the new currency as companies restructured their national operations along continental lines. The long-term boost to growth from the creation of a genuine single market with a single currency will be huge: Just look at how the U.S. economy took off in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth.

IRONICALLY, THE BIGGEST threat to Europe's resurgence is not homegrown. It is that America's unsustainably unbalanced economy will finally crash, dragging the rest of the world down with it. America's brief recession has not purged the excesses of the bubble years. The U.S. economy is still awash with excess capacity from the investment splurge of the late '90s. Americans continue to live beyond their means. The gaping U.S. current account deficit, which swelled to a whopping $503 billion in 2002, bears witness to it. Even relative to the vast U.S. economy, that's big: more than 5 percent of GDP. The economy's continued growth relies on foreigners lending Americans nearly $2 billion extra every working day. And this, at the trough of the economic cycle, when spending on all things foreign is subdued. How huge might the deficit grow if the economy really took off again? Americans are living on borrowed time.

For sure, the day of reckoning can be delayed. The world's biggest economy can defy the odds far longer than, say, South Korea. The Bush administration's Keynesian splurging (sorry, defense spending) has given demand a big

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What's the difference between $110,100 and $27,800?

$110,100

You could be paying for it.

$27,800

An obstetrician in Illinois pays $110,100 a year for malpractice insurance. Next door in Wisconsin, the same doctor would pay $27,800. Why?

There's no good answer, except that the U.S. medical malpractice system is badly broken, and it's threatening the accessibility, affordability and quality of healthcare for millions. Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans cover nearly one in three Americans. Eighty-eight percent of these plans report that the medical malpractice insurance problem increases healthcare costs and decreases access to care – especially for high-risk specialties. Three-quarters of physicians responding to a Harris survey in February said malpractice insurance concerns cause them to order unnecessary tests and make redundant referrals.

Americans know they're picking up the tab for these preventable costs. A separate Harris survey found that 58 percent favor new legislation to limit medical liability and reduce the costs of medical malpractice insurance.

The problem doesn't end there. A new report by the Department of Health and Human Services found that because of the malpractice insurance predicament, "more patients in more states are facing greater difficulty in obtaining access to doctors." Rising rates cause some physicians to refuse high-risk procedures, move their practices to more malpractice-friendly jurisdictions or retire from medicine entirely. Again, Americans know the score. Fifty-nine percent think that malpractice suits and doctors' fear of being sued harm the quality of medical care.

Fortunately, there are steps we can take now to fix this problem before it gets worse. With the leadership of President Bush, Congress has introduced new legislation based on a California law with a quarter-century track record of controlling malpractice costs. BCBSA believes the legislation, which has passed the House and awaits action in the Senate, offers an excellent framework.

Like California and other states that have enacted medical liability reform, the federal legislation would limit "non-economic" damages to $250,000. An analysis by *USA Today* shows that states limiting such awards to $500,000 or less have average malpractice premiums 23 percent lower than states without limits. It is critically important that these protections be extended to all healthcare stakeholders.

As the nation's largest family of healthcare insurance companies, it's clear to us that solving the problem of rising healthcare costs requires a coordinated approach to out-of-control malpractice costs. Most Americans agree.

BCBSA has joined with more than 50 organizations – representing physicians, hospitals, employers, insurers and consumers – in the Health Coalition on Liability and Access. Together we are urging Congress to pass common-sense federal medical liability reforms which protect patients' access to care.

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An Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans

For more information, visit our Web site at www.bcbs.com and click on 'medical liability reform.'

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boost. Alan Greenspan's many interest rate cuts have made borrowing dirt cheap. Shrugging off the stock market slump, consumers continue to spend more than their disposable incomes, adding to their already huge debts. Fizzy house prices give consumers new grounds for exuberance; they are betting the house and more. But it cannot last forever. Americans are likely to pay a hefty price for their reckless profligacy: Recession or prolonged economic stagnation is likely, causing many more Americans to lose their jobs.

The point is not that Europe is better than the United States, still less that the United States should ape European ways. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. Besides, tastes differ: The American dream differs from European concepts of the good life. But it is simply not true that the United States is miles ahead of Europe, that the old world is a basket case, or that it must remodel itself along U.S. lines in order to survive. More generally, economies with higher taxes and stricter regulations are not destined to fail, however much talk there is of them being unsustainable in a global economy.

Only ten years ago, after all, Americans were convinced their country was in inexorable economic decline. In his 1993 best-seller, *Head to Head*, Lester Thurow predicted that Europe, not the United States, would dominate the world economy in the twenty-first century. Bill Clinton swept to the presidency on a simple slogan: "It's the economy, stupid." On the heels of the '90s boom and the continued U.S. economic triumphalism, which has persisted through the slowdown, such pessimism now seems quaint. But, although the gloom and doom was exaggerated, the blind optimism that has replaced it is equally misplaced. The United States was not doing as badly then, and it is not doing as well now.

Ten years on, Europe faces its own crisis of confidence. Many Europeans fret that their countries and continent are in decline. They may resent lectures from arrogant Americans, but many fear that they will indeed be compelled to trade in the European social model they cherish for more Americanized ways. Although there is no denying that Europe faces important challenges of economic reform, the pessimism is overdone. Europe's economy has matched America's in recent years. There is every reason to believe it will do even better in years to come. ■

The threat of European integration.

The Euro Menace

BY ANDREW SULLIVAN

Of all the remarkable consequences of the war against Saddam Hussein, one stands out for its sheer unlikeliness: The subject of Europe has become interesting to Americans again. In the run-up to the war, France and Germany revealed an unprecedented hostility toward the Bush administration's foreign policy. Americans noticed. France, in particular, orchestrated a global campaign to prevent the United States from deposing its former client, Saddam. And, since the war, France has continued to frustrate U.S. foreign policy—most recently when Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin visited Yasir Arafat, whom the United States has tried to isolate. Worse, with the unveiling of a new federalist constitution for a "United States of Europe" in June, the anti-American trend will be subtly but profoundly institutionalized. It's past time that Americans wake up and see this new threat for what it is.

For the longest time, of course, America's approach to European unity was one of supportive neglect. In the wake of World War II, there was no reason whatsoever for the United States to object to increased Western European integration, the expansion of intra-European trade, and the pacification of ancient conflicts, especially between France and Germany. In fact, there were many good reasons to endorse and encourage increased European integration.

But this analysis always obscured something at the heart of the European project. From the beginning, European unity was understood, especially in French eyes, as a counterweight to the global hegemony of the United States. The calculation was simple: No single European power could ever hope to approximate U.S. wealth, population, or power. Even the most formidable European nation—Germany—had a population only one-third as large as that of the United States. A nation such as France, with an ancient history of global influence and a recent history of military humiliation, looked to the European project as a way to regain what it had once lost. Beneath the patina of shared sovereignty, there was the dream of a new sovereignty—more powerful than any in the past. Britain's accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), long prevented by the Anglophobic Charles de Gaulle, was only embraced because it appeared at the time to represent Britain's retreat from its commonwealth and U.S. allegiances, and toward a new commitment to forging a federal European entity.

This single entity was the goal from the start, from the

Continued on page 23 after special advertising section.

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SECURING THE NATION'S ENERGY SUPPLY

Congress and the administration try to fashion a national energy strategy. Where will the country get reliable sources of energy?

On May 19, 2003, *The New Republic* convened a symposium of leaders from the nation's energy sector to debate the problems and solutions Congress is considering as it tries to create a national energy strategy. Energy markets today are experiencing volatile prices, and there are concerns over adequate supplies. Panelists' comments ranged over a wide variety of viewpoints, but most agreed that today's supplies are not adequate to meet industry's needs or society's demands for a clean environment. Panelists also generally agreed that the energy bill under debate on Capitol Hill still will leave open important issues to be resolved in future years. The following is an edited transcript:

MODERATOR: It was approximately two years ago today when the Bush administration energy policy came out. At that time, energy was said to be the No. 1 issue facing the United States. ... Remember when you read that U.S. domestic petroleum production continues to decline? This means that unless something changes, this country will grow ever more dependent on Persian Gulf oil. ... In the aftermath of September 11, you all know what has been done about these things: Nothing has been done about these things.

THE PANEL

ANDREW LUNDQUIST
President, The Lundquist Group
Former Bush White House Adviser

PHIL SHARP
Senior Research Fellow,
Kennedy School of Government
Former Member,
U.S. House of Representatives

ROBERT EBEL
Director of Energy and
National Security Studies
Center for Strategic and
International Studies

W. DAVID MONTGOMERY
Vice President
Charles River Associates

ARMOND COHEN
Executive Director
Clean Air Task Force

MODERATED BY

GREGG EASTERBROOK
The New Republic
Senior Editor

The first subject of discussion would be the energy bill: Should we be happy? Disappointed? Will we need a second energy bill after this one is enacted?

PHIL SHARP: One of the problems is that we have been obsessed in this country with trying to measure our success in energy by how much we import in oil, and it's just a bad measurement. It's not that it's irrelevant; it's just not the right one. The issue is what happens to the world oil market as a whole because it is a very integrated operation.

And the thing that some of us who fought the world oil market for 30 years have to appreciate is, in fact, it has been highly, highly successful over the last 30 years in terms of meeting a huge growth in energy demand. Indeed, 10 years ago, we would have been stunned if there was any way to get through what we have just been through with Nigeria, Venezuela, and Iraq in limited production. People would have thought that was an absolute blowout, and yet—admittedly with a high cost—it solved it.

A lot of things changed to [create this] liberalization in the market. And one of the central things that we have got to get across to people at home and abroad is: we have security, oil, economic, environmental stakes in keeping this market functioning. Now, that's not the only thing that has to happen because there has got to be tough environmental regulation, but we always talk as if the whole game in the United States ought to be to transform that oil market.

ANDREW LUNDQUIST: But I would suggest that there are many other things in this legislation that are important. And, you know, if you looked at the oil markets, I think they're one of the most stable markets. I mean, we have more issues right now with the natural gas market, for example. The electricity market, and also coal, has a lot of uncertainty facing it. Those are the kinds of things we need to put behind us, both [in terms of regulation] and legislatively.

MODERATOR: Do you mean the industry generally?

MR. LUNDQUIST: Yes, [I mean] the industry generally, the energy industry. With the economy the way it has been, it hasn't been too sharp of a problem. But, I would suggest, as we start growing again, that we're facing a real problem here. If you look at natural

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gas prices, we're at almost $6 [per thousand cubic feet] today; this is a shoulder season, typically the lowest point in the year. Last year was somewhere in the $3.40 range, and we're headed into a summer here. We should focus a little bit on that, and there are provisions in the energy bill that would help. But even more than that, I think that there is an impression that Congress and the regulators aren't doing their job by putting some of this stuff behind us so we can stabilize this market, and people can start investing with some understanding of what the future holds.

And I would apply that as well to coal; in other words, emissions. If there isn't some rational regulation and legislating on that issue, the instability going into the future is going to cause some terrible problems in that industry.

MODERATOR: For coal, instability is a potential greenhouse regulation, right?

MR. SHARP: Well, I think that it's not only greenhouse, but it also applies to emissions.

BILL MARTIN: ... Everybody loves gas. It's very interesting, but all of a sudden we hear we're going to have price spikes. And it's a very curious thing. If gas is a panacea, in many ways we need to find more gas. Clearly, we have uses for it. A study we did recently showed, for example, that we just couldn't always add gas turbines to solve our electricity problem. We actually could use [the energy from] gas much more efficiently closer to the consumer in fuel cells or distributed generation. The closer you use it to the consumer in these new technologies, you actually save energy, and you reduce emissions.

And some of our numbers show, for example, that if we do increase natural gas by a significant amount, if nuclear power can be steady at 20 percent ... it makes us very competitive in electricity compared to our economic partners.

W. DAVID MONTGOMERY: What I find incredibly frustrating about energy policy is that Congress is perfectly happy to impose costly solutions on the economy as long as [it] can hide the cost in a regulatory program where you have to go out and argue with the Office of Management and Budget about what it's costing the U.S. economy. [Congress] won't bite the bullet of saying, "We think it's worth doing something about energy security, and we will add 50 cents to the gasoline tax to do it." That effort to conceal the costs of policies, I think, is a major factor that has kept us from adopting the kind of broad-scale economic incentives that actually could make a difference.

ARMOND COHEN: I wanted to jump in and express my frustration with the energy policy debate right now in that I think as much as [there are] certainly emotionally charged issues—and there's a lot of heat on them—I still would submit that, in terms of what we really need to do, they're about the margins and really not about the center.

Phil Sharp:
"THIS IS A PLACE WHERE WE HAVE TO COME TO A JUDGEMENT."

If we're talking about energy security, one of the very significant byproducts of coal gasification could be a relatively low-cost stream of hydrogen for hydrogen fuel cells.

I'm a little frustrated that potentially really breakthrough technologies like that— that are really commercially on the cusp, they really aren't matters of research and development—are not receiving more attention, and we're focusing on these politically sexier issues at the margin.

MODERATOR: Armond, if it's really true that if we have to cut greenhouse gases by 80 percent in the United States, it's simply not going to occur in your lifetime or mine. You and I should run out and invest in a sunscreen manufacturer, because we're just going to have to learn to live with it if 80 percent is the number that's really required.

MR. COHEN: Maybe not over the next 30 years, but over a 60- to 80-year time frame if coal gasification and carbon sequestration are fully commercialized and you have a hydrogen stream. I don't think it's Buck Rogers to think you could be running on about 20 percent of the carbon that we are now, 100 years from now.

MR. SHARP: Increasingly, the rest of the world and the United States understand that there is going to be a carbon-restrained path that we are going to ultimately be on. The question is: how soon and how much. And I think it behooves us in this country to get onto that path more quickly than we are at the moment willing to do.

We are, right now, spending tons of money at the federal level in R&D and yet we have trouble knowing where to focus that. ... All kinds of other investments are being made which might be made differently, or on different time frames, if [investors] had some sense as to what are going to be the constraints. ... Decide now where we're going to be in 2015, in some degree if we can, and then give the marketplace the drive to go find that.

MODERATOR: Can we trust [natural] gas supply? Should policy encourage people to shift to gas, as it has at various points in recent American history?

MR. MONTGOMERY: I'm really concerned about [natural] gas supply at this point, and up until, I would say, a year ago, I'm not sure that I could think of a good policy rationale for encouraging people to shift to gas as opposed to dealing directly with our environmental problems and seeing what falls out from that.

But in the past year, we have not seen encouraging results anywhere on the gas supply side in the U.S. We have had a number of years of at least sporadically high gas prices, of a great deal of activity in drilling for gas throughout the United States, and we have not succeeded in replacing reserves. We're not getting gas in anywhere near the quantities we expected to for the amount of effort that we're putting in.

As we look at other places in the United States, alternatives like coal bed methane are working in the Rocky Mountains, but it's not clear the Canadians really have anything there. Their forecasts of coal bed methane are kind of a plug between what they know they can produce and what they want to export.

And we're seeing prices that I would

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not have thought could have been sustained at these levels. So I think there's a real question. I mean, I'm not yet prepared to forecast that gas prices would reach, you know, $5 per thousand cubic foot in 2010, but it's hard for me to believe a forecast that says they're going to stay between two and three dollars anymore; and I think we're seeing all of the forecasts edge up. And I think what we're facing in gas markets now is a great deal of price volatility. And it's hard for people to deal with that price volatility because in the aftermath of Enron, all of the derivatives and financial market trading that people used to be able to do have really dried up. You can't find creditworthy [companies] to take the other side of the bet if you say, "I want to bet on prices going up or going down."

So we have volatility issues for people today, and then we just have this long-run uncertainty. ... Can we ever find those supplies in the United States? It's not clear.

MODERATOR: Well now, David, my follow-up on that would be that if we can generally trust the market to be smart about these things, and gas prices enter a phase of long-term rises, isn't this going to draw in the capital that will solve these problems, especially the pipeline capital?

MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes, it will draw in the capital to solve the problems. I'm certain it will draw in the pipeline capital. In fact, we're going to see a number of links that have to be built in the pipeline system. It will draw capital into the Alaskan production, it will draw capital into exploration in the United States, but that capital is not going to change the fundamental resource economics of what's in the ground here vs. what's in the ground somewhere else.

MR. SHARP: The practical problem of the Alaskan natural gas pipeline is that it's such a huge capital investment that the volatility we have seen in prices tends to deter anybody from ever making the final decision to go after it. And this is a place where we have got to come to a judgment of whether or not it's in our collective interest to say that we take some of the risks out of that marketplace. ... But the issue now is that maybe we are at the tip of a point, and it is worth us paying that premium margin, just as security.

MR. LUNDQUIST: It's an effort to try and reduce the risk, right, just like Phil said. And to me, it also makes sense because the problem here is you're dealing with is a $20 billion project; it's a hefty project. When these companies are looking at the construction of those kinds of projects, [they are competing] with worldwide projects. I think it's in the U.S. interest to make sure that pipeline's built sooner rather than later, because if you leave it up to the capital markets alone and natural gas prices, I think that we're looking at many more years before it is built.

And even then, it doesn't fulfill the requirements that we're going to have for natural gas. We're using natural gas for industrial [uses], we're using it for heating, we're using for electricity, and now there's this interest in using it to create hydrogen

Andrew Lundquist:
"ALL OF THE EAST COAST IS OFF-LIMITS, ALL OF THE WEST COAST, THE EASTERN GULF IS OFF-LIMITS."

for transportation as well. I don't think that, frankly, it can fulfill that. Even the world production can't fulfill all of that for very long, even though we have a lot of natural gas in the world.

But I couldn't agree with David more. I don't think we're going to [deliver] that much liquid natural gas. I mean, that's a huge ramp up—and there's going to be a lot of opposition to permitting those projects around the country. I think we are headed into a bit of a crunch here, and we have to make some decisions as to whether the U.S. government is going to reduce the risk on some of these capital projects.

MODERATOR: The [American Gas Association] is estimating $150 billion in capital required over the next 20 years. That's for [natural gas] pipelines and distribution lines. [That's] not to find the gas, but just to get the gas that is found to you. So not an impossible figure, but certainly a big money number.

MR. MARTIN: To follow on the gas, all of these fuels have problems. I mean, oil has got the problem with imports and uncertainty in the Middle East. Although I must admit, going into Iraq and winning the Iraq war certainly enhances U.S. energy security...

MODERATOR: Bill, on natural gas, nearby you there are many energy analysts who will point out to anyone who listens that 100 years ago, heat was centrally produced and piped to peoples' homes. And it turned out to be far cheaper and more efficient to give everybody a furnace and let people make their own heat, and that the same may eventually be true of electricity in direct-site production.

But, since we have deregulated electricity, isn't that issue already more or less settled? If the economics permit, you could manufacture your own electricity in your own house today, couldn't you?

MR. MONTGOMERY: I think you're actually identifying that that's the big hole in the restructuring of electric power. And it's what we sort of backed away from after the California energy crisis, which is: How do you deal with retail competition? You have plenty of competition for wholesale power, as it's traded back and forth by the central generators. But the issue of whether you're going to allow alternative forms of delivery to retail customers. ... You know, can you have it sold back to the grid so that everyone is not dependent entirely on his or her own local generation of power?

MR. COHEN: Of the many constraints in the gas area, I really don't think environmental limitations are going to be one of them. We saw the Sierra Club and [the Natural Resources Defense Council] for example, endorse the [Alaska natural gas] pipeline.

In terms of the broader [issue], I agree with your comment earlier. You know, widespread hydrogen production from coal gasification, it ain't going to happen in eight years. I think it might happen in 15 [years] on a large-scale basis if we got going.

MR. EBEL: Gregg, I listen to what's going on here, and I think part of the frustration that we face in trying to put together a meaningful energy policy is that the American consumer, when it comes right down to it, has

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two concerns when it comes to energy, any form of energy. That's price and availability. That's really all he cares about. He doesn't think long-term. The solutions that we have been talking about for natural gas are really long-term: gas from the Arctic, gas from [liquid natural gas] projects, some coming in from overseas, or what have you, that's long-term.

MR. SHARP: And that's going to take some political skill and some negotiation outside of Congress, because there is a serious problem that has developed in Congress over the last decade. It used to be we used the word NIMBY, Not In My Back Yard, as if it were the local people and the local politics that were blocking the action. That is no longer the case.

What has happened is we now have a NIMBY coalition in the Congress of very intelligent, very capable representatives in both political parties from all across the country. So that when you decide that maybe you don't want drilling around the Great Lakes, you have the support of every coastal Senator or every coastal, for that piece of NIMBY—because you, of course, are expected in return to vote for their NIMBY. So it's an expanding proposition, and I think we have got to begin to blow the whistle on that proposition in the Congress.

MR. EBEL: Whether as an individual or as a nation, every decision we make relative to energy carries a trade-off, and that trade-off, in turn, carries a cost. And until we take that into realization, we're not going to make much progress.

MR. LUNDQUIST: All of the East Coast is off-limits, all of the West Coast, the eastern Gulf is off-limits, essentially. There are many areas in the Rocky Mountains—that isn't the answer, Phil, you're totally right. We're not going to produce enough in the Rocky Mountain area, but we need to produce more. ... This administration, the Bush administration, has been deferential to the states—and was in the case of Florida, which is no surprise—and will be as well on those moratoriums off the East and West coasts. But there's a good bit of natural gas in those areas, and I think it needs to be looked at and we should have that dialogue.

MODERATOR: Questions from the audience?

AUDIENCE: Isn't there still a role for regulation to move the markets back to the long-term, away from the short-term bias, particularly electricity?

MR. SHARP: Let me first of all [dispute], the notion that government has a long-term view or that markets have short-term views. ... Politics has a very short-term view in this country. And I think what you're referring to is that at least when we had regulated cost of service there was a tendency to make a long-term decision. ... One of the reasons we moved to deregulation was that precisely none of this was happening.

AUDIENCE: Given that we passed ostensibly an education bill that didn't get fully funded, what is the signal we send if we pass an energy bill but then we don't fully fund [it]? Is it still worth doing?

Robert Ebel:
"WHETHER AS AN INDIVIDUAL OR AS A NATION, EVERY DECISION WE MAKE RELATIVE TO ENERGY CARRIES A TRADEOFF."

MR. LUNDQUIST: The way to answer that is the tax provisions are going—if they pass, right—are going to be funded, all right? The [research and development], I think, is less important for the markets. ... This industry needs to be able to look forward for 10 years and see that there's some stability in the regulations in the legislative side before you're going to see a great bit more investment.

MODERATOR: I'll take a show-of-hands vote on three things. One, the energy bill currently before the Senate, would you vote for it, yes or no? That's the current version of the Senate bill. The second question will be, does the energy bill—assuming it passes—leave unanswered, significant questions that will come back to haunt us, yes or no? And the third question is, if there were a carbon trading scheme to address the environmental effects of energy, would you favor it, yes or no?

...So, let's have our panel vote. We'll make you all United States senators for the moment. So, the first question [is on] the energy bill. As it stands before the Senate now, show of hands, yes, who would vote yea for that bill? (Two panelists raise their hands.) We have two votes on the yea. And voting nay?

MR. SHARP: I would abstain. (Laughter.)

MODERATOR: Phil, you can't abstain. ... All right, we have two years, three nays, and one abstention.

MR. COHEN: Two abstentions.

MODERATOR: You have two abstentions? What are you guys, a pair?

MR. SHARP: We're bargaining for more. (Laughter.)

MODERATOR: All right, so my second question: Assuming the bill passes, will it leave unanswered some major energy issue that will come back to haunt us? Who thinks yes? (All the panelists raise their hands.) Everybody thinks we're leaving something unanswered.

All right, and the third question: energy and the environment. If there were a carbon-trading scheme—assuming it were practical and efficient and blessed by economists—would you vote for it? Who would vote yes? (Four of five panelists raise their hands.)

All right, panelists, we thank you for coming. We certainly thank you for your time and your very thoughtful and intelligent comments. Audience, thank you for coming as well.

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1950 pooling of French and German management of their coal and steel industries and the 1957 Treaty of Rome's commitment to an "ever closer union" between the nations of Europe. Since then, a relentless series of treaties, laws, and institutions has accelerated the trend. From the early days to the expansion of the EEC in the 1970s to the single-market reforms of the 1980s and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, member states slowly gave up salami slices of national sovereignty. Not only did tariffs disappear, so did national laws that did not comport with European-wide guidelines. The European Court of Justice became the last resort for many judicial cases, overriding national judges. And then, of course, came the surrender of monetary and large amounts of fiscal policy to the European Central Bank in the late '90s, capped by the formal introduction of the euro in 2002. Not only is it now impossible for major European countries to run government deficits outside proscribed EU limits, they can't control interest rates or use devaluation of their currencies for economic flexibility, either.

It's hard for Americans to grasp this. But imagine if U.S. interest rates were set by a Canadian central banker stationed in Rio. Imagine if Supreme Court judgments could be appealed to a trans-American court in Brasilia that represented the entire Western hemisphere. Imagine if the dollar was abolished to make way for the "americano," a new common currency that included Mexico, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Changes on this scale are epic. They are transformative of settled domestic politics. And it is only natural that they should lead to drastic changes in foreign policy as well.

Will the USE take on the USA?

This is exactly what has happened in Europe in a blisteringly short period of time. In fact, the more integrated the European economies have become, the more eager European elites have been to fuse the polities as well. Currently, critical decisions—such as taxation and foreign policy—are still largely determined by national governments, although their freedom to maneuver has been sharply curtailed. The president of the European Commission still doesn't have the clout of, say, the British prime minister or the German chancellor. The European parliament, an elected body that does amazingly little, is just as anemic. The solution? A new European "constitution," the final leap from a series of treaties (from which member countries could theoretically still withdraw) to an actual federal European state. The work has now been underway for some time, coordinated by former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. At the looming June 20 European summit, this Euro version of the Federalist Papers will be finalized.

So far, the proposals suggest a huge shift toward what the architects wanted to call the "United States of Europe" (USE). The first draft, released in February, asserted that "the Constitution, and law adopted by the Union Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it by the Constitution, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States." In many cases of national legislation, that is already true. But the current useful fiction is that this is merely a practical matter—the member states routinely assent to EU diktats but aren't constitutionally subordinate. Now the USE would become a separate legal body, and member governments would be formally subordinate to it. The areas of competence for the new superstate range from public health to farming and fishing, from economics to social policy and civil rights. National governments would have no power to regulate these matters unless sanctioned by Brussels. There would be a full-time European president, elected by the European heads of state, and a USE foreign minister—the man whom Henry Kissinger once lamented he could not easily call. In some respects, the European nation-states would end up with less power than the states in the U.S. Constitution.

It's by no means clear that this new constitution will survive the next few months. The European Union will shortly admit ten new members from Eastern Europe (in addition to the current 15) whose views on the matter are mixed. Britain, as usual, will head up the group of nations that is relatively happy with the current setup and will likely veto some of the proposals. But France and Germany, the two central powers in EU politics, will press on regardless. Defenders of the new constitution argue that it is merely "tidying up" the current miasma of treaties and obligations before the European Union expands to 25 countries. But, even if you accept this minimalist interpretation of what's going on, the changes still represent a big, integrating shift. Currently, for example, the presidency of the European Union rotates every six months, with each country having a turn at representing the full 15. Under the new proposed constitution, that will change—with a single EU president, almost certainly from one of the major countries, i.e. France,

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Italy, or Germany, who will serve a term of two and a half years. There will also be a single EU foreign minister, assigned to coordinate the 25 countries' foreign policy. The notion that these powerful new positions won't serve to unify the continent around a single foreign and economic policy is clearly naïve. That's why many of the smaller countries are currently fretting about the EU's consolidation under the influence of the big nations.

If history is any indicator, the integrationists will eventually win out. The new EU entrants from the east may be skeptical, but they are supplicants right now and have nothing like the clout of founding members of the project. Indeed, every latecomer has been sidelined and forced to acquiesce to the federal dream of a single European state. Even Margaret Thatcher, that most dogged of all Euroskeptics, presided over the signing of the Single European Act of 1986, which greatly increased the powers of federal Europe over individual nations; and her Tory successor, John Major, signed the Maastricht Treaty, with a handful of opt-out clauses for the British economy. Maastricht led to the creation of the euro, a currency that was subsequently adopted even by Germany, forsaking its beloved Deutschmark. The euro was not initially popular. Germany adopted it without risking a popular vote. Even the French backed the new currency by the slenderest of margins. But it is now a reality in twelve countries, it will shortly be the currency in ten more countries, and even the British government is formally keen to join. Prime Minister Tony Blair has promised a referendum on the matter, though he still hasn't decided on the timing. The point is, the European idea has won every major battle it has fought. And it would be foolish to bet against it now.

The architects of the new constitution couldn't be clearer about what it means to them. Giscard d'Estaing sees the new USE as an entity that "will be respected and listened to as a political power that will speak as an equal with the largest powers on the planet." Hmm. I wonder which powers he could be thinking about? Or take today's president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. He wants "a single government for all countries who share the money." That, by the way, will include Poland, which the Bush White House is still treating as if it were a separate sovereign country. The questions for the United States are therefore simple: Is this development welcome or unwelcome? And what should U.S. policy be toward its growing momentum and power?

In the past, the default U.S. position was pro-integration. The slow but relentless unification of Europe seemed—and, for the most part, was—an obviously good thing for U.S. interests. In the postwar period, the reconciliation of France and Germany, once thought impossible, became a reality because of the early, essentially economic deal between the two countries. From then, the free-trade area expanded to include the core of Western Europe, fostering prosperity and democratic stability. During the cold war, the cooperation and integration of the Western European democracies also made crucial sense as an anti-Soviet bloc. And, with the inclusion of Britain in 1973, the United States gained an Atlanticist ally within the new entity to offset Gaullist mischief. The EU's predecessor, the European Community, subsequently played a critical role in midwifing Spanish democracy after the Franco dictatorship; in providing massive boosts to small, outlying European countries, such as Ireland; and fostering faster economic growth and freer trade across the continent as a whole. What wasn't to like, apart from French-imposed agricultural subsidies, which both held back the European economy and hurt U.S. agricultural exports? When the Berlin Wall fell, the European Union further helped provide a European structure within which to reunify Germany and a critical incentive for the post-communist states farther east to adopt Western political and economic norms. Even now, the lure of entry into the European Union has helped an Islamic country, Turkey, gravitate toward the West. These were huge achievements. They still are.

But the end of the cold war, the liberation of all of Europe, and the emergence of a U.S. unipolar world all change the equation. So long as the Soviet Union existed, Europe—and specifically its most powerful country, Germany—needed the U.S. security umbrella more than it needed an independent role on the world stage. But, since the collapse of Soviet power and the emergence of a largely peaceful Russia, Germany needs no more such reassurances and has largely acquiesced in France's ambitions to create a European rival to U.S. power. Germany's final capitulation came with the abolition of the Deutschmark. The new euro helps fulfill French ambition by becoming a fledgling counterweight to the dollar in international markets, helping erode the critical U.S. economic advantage of having the uncontested global currency. As it reaches record heights against the dollar, we will soon see whether it can at some point rival the greenback as a global currency, thereby severely limiting America's flexibility in economic policy.

The USE is the obvious next step for this essentially French project. And it couldn't come at a less propitious time for U.S.-European relations. The United States saw the full consequences of the EU's "soft power" in the buildup to the second Iraq war. Although France and Germany had no military capacity to rival Washington's, they had considerable diplomatic clout. By using the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, the European Union, the French and German governments helped unify world opinion against the war. They severely increased the diplomatic costs of U.S. intervention. And, by and large, they won the debate at the United Nations. No second resolution was passed because of European opposition and outreach to other countries around the globe. Yes, Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Poland, and other Eastern European states supported the United States. But, in retrospect, that may turn out to have been the high watermark of European pro-Americanism. President Jacques Chirac warned the new states of the east that their accession to the European Union might be compromised

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by such a pro-U.S. stance. Under a future USE, the British government would nominally still control its foreign policy. But London's ability to go it alone against the weight of the other USE member states could be severely compromised. If the EU foreign minister declares European opposition to a future war by America, the political costs of siding with the United States could be huge for a British prime minister. Even during the buildup to the Iraq war, Blair came close to losing his job by balking at the European consensus. Such foreign policy intransigence could possibly lead to marginalization within the European Union, with all the costs that could entail.

Look at the example of Poland. The Poles' decision not only to support the United States but to send troops and now peacekeepers to Iraq has clearly rankled the French and German governments. The Polish invitation to the Germans to join them in Iraq under the auspices of NATO was brusquely rejected. Prodi lectured Poland in April that "one cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to America." A German diplomat described the Poles to *The Wall Street Journal* as "mercenaries." There have been hints that the EU major powers may try to make sure that Poland bears a cost for being a "bad" European. How likely is it that, within the next decade, if a USE actually emerges and Poland is subsumed within its economic, social, and political fabric, the United States will be able to appeal to Warsaw over the heads of Paris and Berlin? Or that Warsaw will be in any position to respond? The mere threat of reducing agricultural or industrial subsidies could bring an independent Polish government to its knees.

The same can be said even for Britain, Spain, and Italy. Could these European states outvote the Franco-German axis in a new, enlarged Europe? It's possible, but unlikely. The center of gravity in the European Union will always be the Paris-Berlin axis, together with the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). The only way the central dynamic could be changed is if another major European power allied with Germany and cut France off. That isn't likely to happen. A test case occurred in the last few years when Blair tried to bring off an Anglo-German entente. Behind his back, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Chirac simply made a deal on agricultural subsidies that wounded Blair immensely.

Moreover, the future USE in some ways is designed specifically to avoid the larger entity dissolving into a loose federation of nation-states, some Atlanticist, some anti-American. By strengthening the core, expanding majority voting (so no member state can veto major initiatives), and installing a new and more powerful presidency, the French are attempting to corral the new and more diverse Europe into the old Franco-German formula. Yes, there is resentment of France and Germany among the smaller European countries, especially in the east. But they will need Franco-German economic aid more than they will need U.S. military support in the coming years; and their capacity to resist Brussels will be highly limited. The new constitution will marginalize them further still. There is only one rationale for such a proposal at this time: to check U.S. power. In the next global conflict, the French hope the American president will not be able to call up the British or Spanish prime ministers or the Polish president and make a deal. He will have to phone the president of the USE in Brussels. And the conversation won't be pretty.

WHAT CAN THE United States do about this new threat? The sad answer is not much. Attempts to intervene and prevent the new USE from taking shape could backfire. One thing that could unify Europe is a clumsy U.S. intervention to prevent it. But the United States can and should strengthen its military ties to the new Europe, especially Poland and Hungary, and keep an independent relationship with all the Eastern European states. In trade negotiations, the United States could also try harder and harder to unravel European agricultural subsidies. It's this system that keeps some countries dependent on Brussels and could enhance France's leverage over a highly rural country such as Poland. Above all, the United States can let its most reliable European ally, Britain, know that it prizes the relationship, that it does not necessarily believe British adoption of the euro is a good or necessary thing, and that it values Britain's independent military capacity immensely. Keeping Britain both in the USE and outside of it militarily, diplomatically, and monetarily should become a prime U.S. objective in foreign policy. Without it, the United States could lose its most valuable military and diplomatic ally. If you think that's unimportant, imagine the Iraq war—diplomatically and militarily—without the fig leaf of British support.

At the same time, Americans need to wake up and understand the significance of this new rival to U.S. global power. No, it will not be a military threat. But it can be an enormous deadweight on U.S. power, as we saw earlier this year. And its anti-American timbre is unmistakable. Hence the strange paradox of the European Union. It has fostered a culture of post-nationalism. It pretends to oppose the exercise of raw international power. But its rationale—now and for a long time—has been precisely to regain global power for Europe, lost in two world wars and the American century. If the European Union can achieve this, if it can slowly absorb its member states into a uniform and vast new entity, then it will represent a real challenge to U.S. influence in Africa, the Middle East, and every major international institution. The major power that will benefit from this will be France, and France's intentions, as we now know from bitter experience, are essentially hostile to the United States, culturally, economically, diplomatically. That's the current challenge to U.S. foreign policy: how to prevent the new European constitution from becoming a reality, how to woo and keep the loyalty of pro-American European governments and states, how to save new Europe from the stultifying and malign embrace of the old. It may, alas, be too late to prevent the worst. But better late than never. ■

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

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Differing Lives and Places

ALL THROUGH **RESPIRO**, I kept getting reminders of Luchino Visconti's *La Terra Trema.* No wonder. Visconti's film, one of the key works of postwar Italian Neorealism, was made in Sicily in 1947 with fishermen who spoke their dialect. This new picture, written and directed by Emanuele Crialese, is about fishermen on a small island southwest of Sicily, and they, too, speak their dialect. Admittedly, it is arbitrary to judge *Respiro* against the earlier picture, but it is also inescapable. And enlightening.

RESPIRO
(Sony Pictures Classics)

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Visconti made his (fictional) film entirely with fisherfolk in the village of Aci Trezza, asking the villagers to improvise dialogue after he had explained a scene. Their dialect was so provincial that the film needed a voice-over commentary when it was shown on the Italian mainland. The story is about the struggles of the fishermen with the sea and with the dealers on shore who exploit them.

Crialese's film, though it also is in dialect, is performed by at least some professional actors with local folk in the background. (Perhaps because professionals were speaking, it was more comprehensible to mainland Italians.) These fisherfolk are not wretchedly poor: pickup trucks and motorbikes are common, the interiors that we see are middle-class rooms, and the theme is not exploitation. The story is taken from a legend of the place: a wife, so emotionally volatile as to seem fitfully mad, takes drastic steps to avoid being sent to Milan for treatment. The contrast with *La Terra Trema* is not only in standards of living: Crialese must have known that, at least for those who have seen the Visconti picture and possibly for others, his change of subject would reveal a large social shift. The Italian audience, along with us non-Italians, no longer expects a film about fishermen to be about extreme poverty. The focus has shifted from class struggle to interiority.

The setting is Lampedusa. (Oddly, the island's name is not mentioned in the film: only near the end of the closing credits is it cited.) It is not a beauty spot: still, on every side the brown and rocky terrain leads down to an austere, somewhat mystical coastline. In a fishing village, Grazia is the loving wife of a fisherman and the loving mother of three. She suffers from fits and seizures, and when they occur, she needs to be held down and given an injection. When her husband makes arrangements for her treatment in Milan, she runs away. She cannot be found and, since her dress has been left on a beach, is presumed dead. But her middle child, an adoring son of about fourteen, has in fact taken her to a cave where she can hide, has brought her another dress, and daily brings her food. The future of such an arrangement is undiscussed, but it does not matter. She is found—in a balletic scene under the surface of the sea. She and her husband embrace in the water while, around them down there, some villagers dance happily. Thus *Respiro* (which means "breath" but can also mean "respite") sweeps away any lingering relation to Visconti's Neorealism with this quasi-symbolic, quasi-oneiric conclusion.

Respiro is not completely satisfying, because its purpose is cloudy. It is not about the husband's incomprehension of his wife: he loves her, and when she is herself, she responds hotly to that love. Nor is it about a mystical purge, with the stay in the cave restoring her to normality. The initial situation is not in any way changed. The film is merely a succession of odd events. But those events are interesting, and the texture of the village's life is full-fashioned. Crialese, a Roman who had his film education in New York, has cast his film with character insight. Valeria Golino gives Grazia the grace of the woman's name and combines the mature woman with the pent-up spirit in her that is demonic. (Some may remember Golino in a quite different role, as Tom Cruise's girlfriend in *Rain Man.*) As her husband, Vincenzo Amato provides just what is needed—solidity, sex, and irritability. Francesco Casisa has unusual tenderness as the abetting son.

The narrow Manila street is crowded with children playing, with adults doing various jobs. Then we hear the horn of an approaching train. The children and adults scatter, and in the center of this street we see railroad tracks. A train comes slowly toward us with perhaps a six-foot clearance of the houses on each side. Clearly the passage of trains is as much a part of the residents' lives—they return afterward to where they were—as the rising and setting of the sun. This is the locus of Ditsi Carolino's open-eyed documentary about a youngish couple and their life with five children in a minuscule shack on a street of similar shacks.

Life on the Tracks is one of the three films I have seen from this year's **HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH INTERNATIONAL FILM FESTIVAL.** This is the fourteenth festival, which as usual will play in other cities after its Lincoln Center run—Boston, Chicago, and Denver among them—with twenty-eight films and videos from eighteen countries.

The two others that I saw were also exceptional. *Rana's Wedding* is a fictional film by the Palestinian director Hany Abu-Assad and has a near-farcical base: the efforts of an Arab girl in Jerusalem to get married by four in the afternoon. But the obstacles, including roadblocks and checkpoints, are not funny. Abu-Assad has used his premise to dramatize circumstances. *The Last Just Man,* a documentary by Steven Silver, is centrally an interview with Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian who was in command of the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Rwanda during the genocide.

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"Peacekeeping" and "forces" cannot be sufficiently mocked by quotation marks: four hundred soldiers, left in Rwanda by the U.N., could do nothing to stop the slaughter of 800,000 people in one hundred days.

Dallaire, whose health and mental balance were shaken by the experience, recounts the facts of the U.N.'s silences and hesitations about his requests for adequate support. Not much in the film is new, but to hear the details from a man who was there, powerless, along with comments from Rwandan survivors, is once again to make one's membership in the human race very depressing. At the end of the film, after Dallaire has been speaking lucidly but restrainedly for about seventy minutes, he suddenly says, "Enough," and turns away. He is right.

Once again this festival reminds us that despite the prevalent moans about what is playing at the neighborhood cineplex, film-making of a different kind, less visible but closer to blood and bone, continues intensely throughout the world.

Note. Several readers have asked why I have not reviewed either the first *Matrix* film or its sequel, especially since the theme has evoked so much serious comment. But serious themes are hardly new in science fiction. In the 1950s, when I was a book editor, I dealt with, among other sorts of books, some science fiction, including novels by Ray Bradbury, Arthur C. Clarke, Frederik Pohl, and C.M. Kornbluth, most of which were built on serious ideas and were really readable, not mere aggrandized juvenilia à la *The Matrix.* Intellectuals comparable to those who are now discussing the *Matrix* films might just as easily have examined back then the core themes of *Fahrenheit 451* by Bradbury and *The Space Merchants* by Pohl and Kornbluth. In any case this quite familiar utilization of serious thought does not in itself make the *Matrix* films more than the adolescent fodder that they are. ■

ROBERT BRUSTEIN ON THEATER

Dysfunctional Dynasties

NO DOUBT THERE ARE healthy families in the world, but—outside of Rodgers and Hammerstein and *Our Town*—how often do you see them on the stage? Consider Oscar Wilde's **SALOME**. This overheated biblical tale, originally composed in French by a wit normally associated with epigrammatic comedies, could have been the model for Albee's *The Goat* considering how it attempts to revise our notions of "normal" sexuality. King Herod lusts after his stepdaughter, who in turn has the hots for John the Baptist (here called Jokanaan). When the prophet refuses to kiss her, Salome performs for Herod what may be the first striptease in recorded history, demanding as payment the decapitation of the man who rejected her. After Herod reluctantly complies, she then spends an inordinate amount of time kissing Jokanaan's bloody mouth and caressing his severed head. Disgusted by the girl's "monstrous" behavior, Herod has his soldiers smother Salome beneath their shields.

SALOME
(Ethel Barrymore Theater)

GYPSY
(Shubert Theater)

LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT
(Plymouth Theater)

In the current staged reading of the play, a company from the Actors Studio, guided by artistic director Estelle Parsons, has launched a performance that would have given Lee Strasberg a serious nosebleed. Ever since Parsons's famous screaming fit in *Bonnie and Clyde,* it has been clear that she is an actor willing to take that extra leap beyond conventional realism into the outer limits of behavior. Directing *Salome,* she brings the whole cast with her into this uncharted territory, offering no excuses for an essentially ludicrous play, but rather making a virtue of all its excesses.

Consider, for example, Al Pacino's characterization of Herod the Tetrarch. After his minimalist work in *The Godfather,* Pacino first demonstrated in *Scarface* that he could also be an actor of almost byzantine extravagance. Both his stage and movie performances have become increasingly operatic ever since. As Herod, Pacino suggests that his acting is not so much a search for new characters as a pastiche of highlights from past performances, not unlike a literary palimpsest or a painterly pentimento. Costumed in a tuxedo jacket, a Turkish vest, and a black silk shirt, Pacino's Herod is clearly a recycled version of many of the actor's recent roles, particularly Richard III and Richard's modern counterpart Arturo Ui. His hair tousled, his eyes asquint, his eyebrows raised, Herod occupies his throne the way the mobster Arturo slouched in his chair—disheveled, derelict, edgy, nervous, fidgeting on his perch. Pacino can appear very small on a piece of furniture, and the way he uses his long fingers to scratch his arms or to grope his knees suggests that a primary image for the role was that of a chimpanzee. Turning the act of sitting almost into an art in itself, Pacino delivers Wilde's *Yellow Book* prose in a manner that transforms awkward archaisms into divine comedy. ("He raises the dead? I do not wish him to do that!")

Marisa Tomei as Salome exposes her navel and her urban accent—I looked in vain for her tattoo and cell phone. This is obviously a Salome brought up in the New York area, combining the petulance of a West Side princess with the hauteur of a Westchester debutante. She is also pretty crackers from her very first entrance. Still, Tomei, performing the dance of the seven veils with frenetic intensity, contributes a totally committed performance, one that, like Pacino's, has the courage of its own absurdity. As for David Strathairn, stern and dignified as Jokanaan, and Dianne Wiest, smiling her Mona Lisa smile as the vindictive Herodias, both have the good sense to underplay in the face of Pacino's and Tomei's Sturm-und-Dranging.

The production is billed as a reading, and, apart from Salome's wild dance, most of the cast does sit throughout the performance, turning pages on a music stand. Since the show has been in rehearsal for several months, a cynic might conclude that this proves that movie stars are unable to remember their lines. That would be wrong. While the actors do turn the pages, they rarely look at the script, and (*mirabile dictu*) none of the major performers mentions a single movie credit in his or her biography. All

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in all, this *Salome* is a worthy enterprise by actors committed to the stage and not afraid to look foolish on it. I came away admiring their grit, their courage, and their lunacy.

GYPSY is one of those remakes dominating Time After Time Square these days. Some critics are calling it the ultimate Broadway musical, possibly because it is so relentlessly self-referential—show business regarding itself in a mirror. *Gypsy* brings us another of those dysfunctional families so dear to the stage, with the difference that this one has been born to the stage. Basing his book on the memoirs of Gypsy Rose Lee, Arthur Laurents has turned her rags-to-G-string story into that of an ugly duckling who metamorphoses into a swanky swan. Mother Rose is determined to make Baby June a star of the vaudeville circuit. (June, aka June Havoc, actually did become a star, and later wrote a memoir too.) "I had a dream," Rose sings, "a wonderful dream, Papa." But June's dream turns sour after she runs off with one of the hoofers, and Mama is forced to turn her beady eyes on Louise. Showing little talent for vaudeville, Louise (later Gypsy Rose Lee) nevertheless manages to become the Salome of the burlesque circuit, albeit one who prefers not to drop the final veil. (When I was fourteen, I lied about my age to get in to see this sophisticated, languorous stripper perform at Minsky's.)

Laurents's unsparing portrait of a ruthless stage mother, along with Jule Styne's brassy score and Stephen Sondheim's acid lyrics, raise this musical above the level of the usual Broadway kitsch, though it is not quite the masterpiece people have been told to expect. (On the night I saw it, the audience bravoed Marvin Laird conducting the overture as if he were Furtwangler conducting the *Leonora* Overture No. 3.) Sam Mendes, the director, has staged the show with his customary theatrical efficiency, aided by an effective design team and the original choreography of Jerome Robbins. The action takes place in an empty backstage area full of discarded props and flats with their ribs showing—a lot of money has been spent to make the Shubert stage look empty. The geography is changed to the accompaniment of vaudeville placards, while June and Louise (whose act keeps them permanently fixed at the age of ten) grow into adults to the accompaniment of whirring strobe lights, as per Robbins's choreography.

From our first glimpse of a red striped show curtain, we know that we are in show-biz heaven. Everything has been staged within an inch of its life, with enough sequins and spangles to decorate a hundred boutiques. Mendes, who has a talent for anatomizing flawed women, handles the hard-bitten female characters with authority, especially Bernadette Peters, whose frayed singing voice was pretty unmodulated on the night I saw the show, but who acts with a kind of stubborn unblinking power. She is also mighty good at catching Rose's unapologetic provincialism. (Herbie: "Don't you know there's a Depression?" Rose: "Of course I know. I read *Variety*!") Tammy Blanchard as Louise, moving from timidity to authority, is also persuasive, especially when she discovers with surprise that "I'm pretty, Mama." And the three strippers (Heather Lee, Kate Buddeke, and Julie Halston), while totally lacking in erotic appeal, nevertheless wring all the comedy out of the classic "You Gotta Get a Gimmick."

Among the men, John Dossett has breezy charm as Herbie, Rose's preternaturally patient beau, though he is forced to enact the most unconvincing plot twist in the evening—leaving Rose because she allowed Louise to become a stripper. Ultimately, what distinguishes Laurents's book, and what most moves the audience, is the complex mother-daughter relationship, climaxing in Rose's realization that "Mama's gotta let go." By explaining Rose's vicarious behavior as the act of someone who "just wanted to be noticed," Laurents has managed to elicit sympathy for that most maliciously caricatured of women, the American stage mother. But too much of this musical is about show business's nostalgia for show business.

Perhaps the ultimate dysfunctional stage family, if we discount those in *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet,* are the four Tyrones in O'Neill's **LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT.** O'Neill knew them well, since they were surrogates for his own family, and the painful composition of a play that was "written in tears and blood" was his way of exorcising his ghosts. O'Neill had been trying to write Greek tragedy for years. He finally succeeded with *Long Day's Journey* because he had at last come to understand the nature of *ananke*, or fate—how the past is linked to the present and to the future.

As a result of this understanding, *Long Day's Journey* may be the most relentlessly causal play ever written. A twitch in one character causes a spasm in another; every action has an equal and opposite reaction. If Tyrone hires a cheap doctor, Mary acquires a morphine addiction. If Edmund has literary gifts, Jamie feels like a failure and resents his brother. In the first act, the Tyrones seem to be a normal happy family. By the time day turns to fog-shrouded night, they have all unearthed one another's tortured secrets

The Colony of Us

Someone treads the thin carpet of the evacuated flat above—
Yesterday the shopping trolley at its door refilled in motley surges
As though its driver purchased in anticipation of natural disaster,
Hurricane or holiday.

On with the morning news, up with the volume. The pipes?
The pipes, or the wind. Else we have celebrated our solitude in vain.
Else the emptied bottle left standing wears its ornate label
Like a vanquished flag.

Too soon we have drained the creak and stomp of human feeling.
Despite the trolley's marathon of laps, the parting sneer
We perceived through our own drawn, dark curtain,
We are less and less alone,

However the world would seem to relinquish us.

CARRIE ETTER

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and proven Sartre's conviction that "hell is other people." There is a curse on the house of the Tyrones whose origin lies elsewhere, with existence itself. The family is chained together by guilt, resentment, recrimination, and love.

This kind of symbiosis obviously requires ensemble acting of the highest order, and for three of the play's four acts the Goodman Theater production largely achieves it. Within Santo Loquasto's cavernous Richardson-type set, lighted with chiaroscuro luminosity by Brian MacDevitt, Robert Falls directs a company unusually at ease with one another, even if they don't always seem like members of the same tribe. Indeed, the mother of the family, Mary Tyrone, barely throws a glance at the others. As played by Vanessa Redgrave, she is the most isolated character on stage, as well as the magnet of the evening. Gray-haired, wraithlike, and angular, her arthritically gnarled hands continually playing around her mouth, Redgrave gives a brilliant demonstration of the psychotic effects of drug addiction on a gentle soul, as well as the extraordinary lengths to which a person will go to conceal it. The utter loneliness of the character is heartbreaking. And so is the latent anger she reveals when either nerves or memories turn her into a wild raging animal.

The trouble is that having started at this high pitch, Redgrave has nowhere to go. The final "mad" scene, when Mary descends the stairs holding her ancient wedding dress, in pigtails and talking like a very young girl, seems to be a replay of what we have already seen, with the result that what is meant to be the most harrowing moment in the entire play leaves us dry-eyed and unsatisfied. With the possible exception of Philip Seymour Hoffman as Jamie, in fact, none of the cast manages to conquer the last act, which is basically four long excavations of pain.

Although Brian Dennehy rarely persuades us that James Tyrone was once a great matinée idol, the actor (who grows with each of his stage roles) displays an engaging naturalistic lilt and considerable Irish charm. He is a pleasure to watch on stage as he snarfs out the humor of the play like a pig finding truffles. What he misses are the depths of the character, plumbed through drink and remorse over his compromised career. Nor does Robert Sean Leonard, as O'Neill's surrogate Edmund, get a good grasp on his elegiac fourth-act speech. It is there, as the lad remembers his experiences on shipboard, alone in the fog as if walking on the bottom of the sea, that O'Neill achieves the condition of poetry for the first time. But instead of reaching inside himself for the memories, Leonard reads the lines from a book as if they were something Edmund had already written for some future play.

Hoffman's Jamie is, to my mind, the most completely fulfilled performance. Looking a lot like an incipient Willy Loman, which is to say very much Brian Dennehy's son, Hoffman also shows us the seamy side of a down-at-heels song-and-dance man. And he truly understands the ambivalence of Jamie's character—how he can simultaneously love and hate his own brother, how he can ridicule the condition of the mother he adores. He also makes a fine roaring drunk whose story of his night with Fat Violet is one of the highlights of the evening.

All in all, this is a presentable if flawed production of a masterpiece, acted and directed with considerable integrity. Like so many plays in the canon, *Long Day's Journey* demonstrates how hard it would be for drama to survive without unreconciled mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters. Long live dysfunctional dynasties! ■

Mahnaz Ispahani
The Cauldron

PAKISTAN: THE EYE OF THE STORM
By Owen Bennett Jones
(Yale University Press, 352 pp., $29.95)

PAKISTAN: IN THE SHADOW OF JIHAD AND AFGHANISTAN
By Mary Anne Weaver
(Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 304 pp., $24)

I.

THE DAILY MANIFESTATIONS of Pakistan's many crises, of identity, poverty, religious radicalism, and regional provocations, can be easily tracked in the pages of the morning papers, but not so the dire question of where Pakistan is headed. After September 11, 2001, a proper understanding of the Pakistani puzzle became essential to global security, but one finds few probing or knowledgeable notions about the shifting nature of this experiment in Muslim nationhood, and even fewer good ideas about how to halt its seemingly unstoppable decline. The most interesting American and European discussions of Pakistan are often the work of journalists, such as Owen Bennett Jones and Mary Anne Weaver. Both their books suggest that without some resolution of Pakistan's ills, the consequences for the country, the region, and the world will be severe. And neither writer is sanguine that such a resolution will come.

Weaver tacks anecdotes from her travels to Pakistan together with her post–September 11 reflections on Osama bin Laden, his crowd, and American policy, so as to lightly sketch a country overshadowed by "jihad and Afghanistan." Her book asks the big questions, but it does not really try to address them; instead it contains stories based on her dispatches for *The New Yorker* of "irascible chiefs" and Arab falconry, old news of Benazir Bhutto, and much conversation with retired generals and "top" advisers. She is astute about the old Pakistan, but the many modernities of Pakistan remain mostly hidden in her book, from the Web-based Islamist intelligentsia to the fights for human rights to that most modern of all Pakistani predicaments—being caught between Muslimness and Islamism.

Bennett Jones, by contrast, sees some of the complexities of Pakistan's politics, the co-existence of old and new powers from the powerful and sophisticated army to the middle-class Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a once-inspiring secular political grouping of *muhajirs*, or immigrants from India in 1947, which increasingly turned fascistic, violent, and splintered. (Its leader Altaf Husain lives in exile, like Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.) Drawing on existing scholarship and on his own original reporting on the rise of Pervez Musharraf, he provides a sharp

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and probing analysis of Pakistan's trajectory since its inception in 1947. And yet his book, too, finally fails to address adequately the life-and-death issues facing Pakistan: the country's severe economic crises; the contest between opposing claims to the country's leadership by religious elites, soldiers, and the secular forces; and the primary arenas of confrontation, that is, the cultural battles about education and the status of women. Both Bennett Jones and Weaver add little to the conventional wisdom that the army is the "final arbiter" in Pakistan. Their books are all politics and very little culture.

BENNETT JONES SAYS THAT "Pakistan matters." Well, yes. But before September 11, while these writers were at work, it was almost a forgotten country. On September 10, 2001, Pakistan was a pariah state, heavily sanctioned by the United States, isolated internationally, and falling further into an economic abyss. As the war on terror began, Pakistan was once again recognized for its strategic significance. A new relationship with the United States was swiftly struck, and General (and then President) Pervez Musharraf was lauded as a hero.

By the criteria of George W. Bush's "axis of evil," however, Pakistan might rank near the top of the list of the world's most dangerous countries. (Bernard-Henri Levy, who has just published a huge and melodramatic book called *Qui a tué Daniel Pearl?,* or *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?,* certainly thinks so. He calls Pakistan "the most delinquent of delinquent nations.") With a population of around 145 million expected to grow to 250 million in less than twenty years, Pakistan is a deeply combustible place, a thriving haven of terror, a nuclear power (with the ability to manufacture an estimated thirty to fifty nuclear weapons), and a country where power is newly and uneasily shared between soldiers and mullahs. Criminal terror gangs work the cities of Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta, and of course the porous border territories between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For every Al Qaeda terrorist caught by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies—and so far around five hundred of them have been apprehended—another two, three, or more turn up shortly thereafter. Following fast on the heels of these Arab *jihadis* are the so-called local militants—those who are the adepts of the holy war for Kashmir and mix it up with sectarian, Christian, and American victims inside Pakistan. After a brief period of dormancy under a Musharraf-led crackdown after September 11, these extremist groups are reviving. Some have simply changed their names. Many are actively using the Web to preach and to recruit. Newsletters, pamphlets, and manuals demanding the deaths of Hindus and Jews are easily available at newsstands.

Pakistan's domestic ills are daunting; the country is nearly ungovernable. The judiciary and the police are viewed as corrupt and partial. Fewer and fewer people vote in each successive election. Law and order is most notable for its absence. Karachi, the foremost industrial center and the largest city, has long been an incendiary mix of warring parties, ethnic, sectarian, and now terrorist, whose casualties include its own citizens, its visitors, and more generally the country's attractiveness to investment, both domestic and foreign. While there are rich soldiers, politicians, landowners, and businessmen, few taxpayers or investors are to be found. Pakistan follows only India and Egypt on the list of the world's largest recipients of official development assistance—$58 billion between 1960 and 1998—but its economy remains in shambles. Its poor are growing poorer. After decades of declining rates of poverty, the ranks of the poor swelled by twelve million people between 1993 and 1999 alone.

In Pakistan, moreover, the war on terror intersects perilously with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Tests conducted in 1998 brought the news of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is perfectly correct to question the security of these weapons in such an unstable place, where the disgruntled are many and include nuclear scientists and military officers unhappy with Musharraf's American connection. It is also correct to worry that the jihadis who fight in Kashmir, or their patrons, might target nuclear sites or obtain nuclear material. And Pakistani authorities themselves may be no strangers to the clandestine trade in nuclear technologies. In April, the United States formally imposed a toothless sanction on a Pakistani company (as opposed to the government itself) amid charges of trading nuclear know-how with North Korea. Even as Musharraf announced a complete reversal in Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan under American pressure in September 2001, he told his country that he did so to preserve the two other pillars of his national security policy: Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's cause in Kashmir.

Bill Clinton was right to call South Asia "the most dangerous place in the world." The increasing asymmetry between Pakistan's and India's conventional forces threatens an escalation to nuclear confrontation, provoked perhaps by the intractable struggle over Kashmir. Last year the world watched tensely as India and Pakistan escalated first their hostile rhetoric and then their troop levels, until one million armed men faced off on the borders. (A few weeks ago a welcome if uncertain thaw occurred in the relationship.) Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons can strike sites within each country in three to five minutes, and American defense agencies estimate that twelve million people will die in any exchange, depending on the winds. All this in a region where the ignorance about the effects of nuclear weapons is pervasive—most people see them merely as bigger bombs—and governments discourage sane public discussion. (In both Pakistan and India, frenzied *madrassa*-boy or saffronized Hindu public adulation of the bomb is of course permitted.)

YET PERHAPS THE GREATEST danger comes from Pakistan's own tendency toward self-destruction—not from technology or the conflict with India, but rather from the domestic identity wars that are reaching a boiling point. The muddle in Pakistan has always been about its identity as a nation-state. Created by coalitions of Muslim politicians, feudals, industrialists, and Western-educated civil servants who foresaw the likelihood of their community's decline in an undivided post-British India, this Muslim country has survived few of the tests of nationhood unscathed. In 1971, when the Muslims of East Pakistan won their bloody liberation from the Muslims of West Pakistan, Pakistan became a rump state, and the idea of a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent should have been wrecked on the shoals of linguistic, ethnic, and geographic differences. But thirty-two years later, with more mullahs in government than ever before vociferously demanding that Pakistan be true to its Islamic statehood, Pakistanis are arguing once more about just how Islamic the Pakistani republic should be and who will control its fate.

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Was the slippery slope toward an uncompromising Islamism inevitable in a country created by Muslim liberals out of an argument that Indian Muslims constituted much more, culturally and politically, than a minority? Can the global Islamists today take advantage of the contradictions of Pakistan's birth to haunt the state—or have Pakistanis built up enough history to claim a non-Islamist future for their country?

Only two years after the secession of East Pakistan, Pakistan's Constitution of 1973 reiterated its Islamic direction. It stated that sovereignty belongs to Allah alone and that "all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the holy Quran and Sunnah." It was not until the 1980s, however, that constitutional text became political fact. Global circumstances facilitated the process of Islamization, just as they are doing again today. The Iranian revolution created a new and religiose atmosphere. And owing to the need for Pakistan to help fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and then after the war was won and over in the 1990s, the United States left domestic developments in Pakistan unattended: a momentous mistake best not repeated.

It was not the mullahs, though, who successfully Islamized the country, and re-shaped the idea of Pakistan, in the 1980s. That accomplishment was the work of Zia ul Haq, a harsh general who ruled the country from 1977 to 1988. The United States abetted Zia's domestic transformation, including the implementation of Islamic laws particularly painful for women, by financing him generously. The meager opposition that Zia faced at home came largely from groups that are not of much interest to Bennett Jones and Weaver, who generally neglect the battles over ideas and cultures. It is especially egregious that they ignore Pakistan's women's movement, which has been widely emulated for its principles and its strategies. These remarkable women were among the first to challenge Zia's dictatorial and Islamization policies, and to question openly the right of the mullahs to interpret Islam exclusively or to claim sole possession of the definition of Muslim identity. While the politicians largely sat silent on the sidelines, the women took to the streets to call for greater democracy in Pakistan. It is these women who, at a high cost to themselves, have been most articulate about the rights of minorities, the protection of women, the education of the illiterate in their rights under Islam, and more.

Zia's civilian successors did little to reverse his policies. The general opened up a political space for the mullahs that seems nearly impossible to close today. And in turn the mullahs today are opening up a political space for the militants. The Pakistan of Mohammed Ali Jinnah—Muslim but secular, and democratic, and a Muslim country practicing freedom of religion—has mostly been jettisoned. The great constitutional strategist for Muslim rights and citizenship now represents an antiquated secularism. In fact, "secularism" is a tarnished, even incendiary word in Pakistan, denoting *ladiniyat* or "irreligiosity." And, depending on the political tenor of the moment, Jinnah is alternatively reviled by the Islamists as a false Muslim or claimed as the truest believer in an Islamic state. To call Jinnah secular today is, as one leading Islamist intellectual puts it, to follow "the American vision."

By the 1990s, Pakistan was slipping silently into a declining statehood and a plenitude of violence. These were crucial but wasted years, in which the destructive rivalry of civilian politicians Bhutto and Sharif preoccupied Pakistan. Their winner-take-all governments succeeded at little—not even at insuring their own survival. Three civilian governments were dismissed on charges of corruption. The army never surrendered its commanding interest in politics. For this reason, no elected government in Pakistan has ever completed its term in office.

In this Pakistan, Bennett Jones argues, "democracy has few supporters." He is right. Weaver concurs, vividly reporting on nostalgic feudals (2 percent of whom control around 44 percent of the country's farmland). Both books make it hard to imagine that democracy in feudal Pakistan stands any chance at all. To be sure, the rhetoric of democracy is ubiquitous. Even the religious parties speak it. But nobody is practicing what they preach. The existing political parties have no accountability, either internally or to their constituents; their leaders lead for life.

Ask about democracy in Pakistan and the politicians are the first to tell you that only after the nation's poor are educated can they become democratic. Whether the landed politicians have done anything to further democracy through education is another matter. Nearly two-thirds of the adult population cannot read or write, and only 60 percent of children eligible for primary school actually attend one. According to Oxfam International, in a couple of years Pakistan will account for 40 percent of all South Asian children out of school, compared with 27 percent in 1995. The trend is ominous. Even when school facilities exist, the textbooks are so filled with hatred that one has to ask whether educating Pakistanis (or Indians, for that matter, whose own textbooks are being rewritten by Hindu chauvinists) will only worsen the violence in the region. Racist references to Hindus abound, and, as a leading scholar says, the accepted social studies curriculum suggests that if children follow their texts they will be able by the age of nine to "acknowledge and identify forces that may be working against Pakistan."

The question of education is not prominent in either Weaver's or Bennett Jones's book, but it is a critical battlefield between the Islamists, the state authorities, and other claimants to Pakistan. This is not surprising, since the most urgent questions in Pakistan now are whose country it is, to whose vision it should conform, and who is a Muslim. For American and European aid donors, education is a strategic priority. They emphasize the reforming or the closing down of the radical *madrassas,* and also the educating of the outrageously deprived Muslim girls, who, the theory goes, will grow up to topple the Islamists and fulfill the foreign policy goals of the United States. The weakest sector of Pakistani society will lead the American revolution. For local Muslim professionals, education reform is central to redirecting Pakistan's downward economic spiral and eliminating a brutal and inequitable gender gap that reifies the

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unjust subjugation of women and the poverty of poor households. And for the Islamists, the control of education and the control of women are the sine qua non of the Islamization of Pakistan.

II.

NO GROUP UNDERSTANDS THE political and ideological centrality of the question of education, and of the question of the segregation of women from men, as clearly as the religious parties, of which the most ideologically coherent and influential is the Jamaat-e-Islami. In the elections of October 2002, the Jamaat enjoyed success as part of an alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis e Amal or United Action Front (MMA), made up of distinct, often quarreling Sunni and Shia parties. The MMA commands 20 percent of the seats in parliament, forms the government in the North West Frontier Province, and shares power in Baluchistan. Other MMA parties include the Jamaat e Ulema e Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat e Ulema e Pakistan (JUP). Small, frisky parties with ties to militant groups, the former follows the puritanical Deobandi school of Islam, while the latter is Barelvi, more accommodating to the traditional saints.

But the Jamaat is Maududist, and therefore of enormous interest to anybody concerned with Islam and global politics. It was founded in 1941 by Maulana Abu'l Ala Maududi, who was arguably the most influential radical Islamist thinker of the twentieth century. Maududi's thought and the Jamaat's practice should place Pakistan at the intellectual epicenter of the wave of Islamist radicalism sweeping through the world today, and not, as is often thought, as a secondary staging ground for Arab terror activities. It was Maududi's work, circulated in Egypt in 1951, that helped radicalize the now world-famous Sayyid Qutb, the pre-eminent intellectual patron of Arab jihadis. And it was from Maududi and Qutb that Ayatollah Khomeini drew some of his historical thinking and rhetorical force. The writings of Maududi, Qutb, and Hassan Al Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood inspired the Arab mujahideen in the Afghan wars of the 1980s. Reading Qutb can feel a lot like re-reading Maududi, particularly in his assault on Westernized (that is to say, false) Muslims.

Maududi was born in Aurangabad, in present-day India, in 1903. An autodidact and a sometime journalist, he wrote well over one hundred books and lectured around the world before his death in Buffalo in 1979. Given his start in religious teaching and theological study by the powerful modernist Muslim thinker Muhammad Iqbal, who argued that each generation, "guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems," Maududi arose to preach the restoration of an Islamic state modeled on the one that existed during the life of the prophet Muhammad and the early Caliphate. Islam, for Maududi, permitted no distinction between the worldly life and the spiritual life—what is God's is God's and what is Caesar's is God's. Muslims could not be half-Muslims. Maududi staunchly insisted upon the sole sovereignty of God on earth, and he taught that man is not free to decide his affairs. On these premises he built the mutually reinforcing edifice of true Muslimness and an Islamic state, unmodified by the intellectual and political complexities of more than fourteen hundred years of Muslim histories.

For an Islamic revolution, said Maududi, "the mind of man should first be disabused of the idea of independence and mankind should realize that the universe in which we live is ... governed by an All Powerful Sovereign.... It behooves us to deny obedience to all authority which does not itself owe allegiance to Him and to refuse to serve any person or group of persons who act independently of the Will and Purpose of the Creator. This is the bedrock basis of all reformation." If democracy means human sovereignty or man-made laws, then Maududi had no use for it, and nor (despite their use of political partyhood and electoral campaigns) can his party, the Jamaat.

Maududi first opposed the creation of Pakistan, decrying the un-Muslimness of the pro-partition leadership, leaders whose minds were enslaved by Western education. He also denounced secular nationalism, which he called the "curse of the nation-state." The "distinguishing mark of an Islamic state," he said, "is its complete freedom from all traces of nationalism." In the new Pakistan, Maududi instructed his party's exclusive membership—a highly organized vanguard of moral men (and, later, moral women)—to toil relentlessly for the creation of an Islamic state. The Jamaat transitioned easily from anti-Hinduism to nationalistic anti-Indianism.

OFTEN JAILED IN PAKISTAN, Maududi had an uncomplicated, uncompromising, and exclusionary vision, a radical summons to the spiritual renovation of Muslims led astray by Western thought that falsely separated personal religion from political religion. Maududi's polemic was as internal to Islam as Qutb's. His book *Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam*, which appeared in 1939, has become a central Islamist text, endlessly reprinted and translated. It argues for sexual segregation as a fundamental requirement for ordering men's desire, and for limiting moral depravity, nudism, licentiousness, and all such Western diseases. Foreign cultures were the most pernicious threat to Muslim societies, and so Maududi demanded a re-orientation of education policy that would give rise to a differently educated Muslim leadership. He discarded the narrow *madrassa* mentality of Islamist traditionalists, which eschewed sciences and technologies that might be gleaned from abroad, and also what he saw as the Westernized social sciences and the absence of religious studies in the curriculum of the modernists: "One of these fails to prepare people to shoulder the practical responsibilities of worldly life, while the other fails to provide any religious guidance or moral orientation. These conflicting systems of education have produced people with fundamentally different outlooks which has resulted in a dangerous internal conflict in Muslim society." In one sense, Maududi was right: Pakistan's current catacomb of educational systems—in English and in Urdu, in *madrassas*, in public schools, and in private schools—is producing a highly compartmentalized citizenry with few shared values or skills.

It is this openness to the sciences that gives the Jamaat its air of greater reason. Working with Pakistani realities, the Jamaat has long had a policy of advocating strategic participation in, and the reform of, mainstream education. Unlike the JUI and the JUP, the Jamaat, whose members are broadly educated and often professionals, is not *madrassa*-based. For the Jamaat, the decline of Pakistan's educational system presents a "security risk to the existence of Pakistan." In 1997 the Jamaat demanded the creation of a uniform syllabus to spread Islamic

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

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

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

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ideology, and the elimination of English as the medium of instruction, and restrictions on foreign aid to education, and the rooting out "of the secular thinking based on the segregation of the state from religion"; and, always, segregated education. Despite having a Women's Wing, and now a daughter of the Jamaat's leader Qazi Husain Ahmad in parliament, gender segregation, *purdah* or veiling, and Islamic laws governing women and family life remain central tenets of Maududism. And thanks to Zia and the reluctance of his successors to challenge Maududism, the most misogynistic and discriminatory Islamic laws remain on the books in Pakistan.

As Pakistanis wrestle with their political future nearly twenty-five years after Maududi's death, Maududism is growing prominent in the corridors of power. This new prominence, when joined with the street power of its violent student factions, makes the Jamaat a force to be reckoned with. (These days its boys are busy tearing down "obscene" billboards and pushing for a Ministry of Vice and Virtue in MMA-controlled provinces.) Owing to the particular circumstances of Pakistan's birth and subsequent constitution, Islamist discourse can more easily gain authority wherever it is permitted or encouraged by the state. And it has. Neither civilian politicians nor ruling soldiers have been able to reverse Islamic laws once they have been adopted. Islamic slogans are always above criticism. The high expectations that Benazir Bhutto, the female leader of the largest and most secular party in the 1990s, would rid Pakistan of some of the most discriminatory Islamic legislation and bar customary violence against women were quickly crushed. Musharraf, too, promised and then failed to amend the much-used Islamic law against blasphemy, which demands the death penalty.

There is a reason that Islam's laws sometimes seem more equitable to Pakistan's poor men. When fairly interpreted, they are an improvement on the retrograde laws of tribe and landlord in Pakistan. Customary practices such as honor killings and other murders of women are popular among the tribes and the rural elite; they are free to exercise their cruel whims. Such crimes and abuses increase the appeal of Islam's social promise to the poor. To stop the spread of Maududism and its relatives in Pakistan, therefore, the stranglehold of these elites must also be broken. But the political ground in Pakistan has already shifted to such an extent that even if the ostensibly secular parties of Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif were to return to power, they would likely, as in the past, remain feudal and seek persistently to reinforce their Islamic credentials. By the end of the 1990s, in fact, Sharif's rightist party had sought so assiduously to co-opt Islamism and the Islamist vote through its policies that the Islamists' goals in government were well in sight. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) partnered as needed with the Shia parties and the JUI. And the tendency to capitulate grows: in July 2002, Musharraf found himself reassuring the mullahs that "there is no move toward secularism. Pakistan was born an Islamic state and nobody has the authority to change its Islamic character."

In the current circumstances, the notion of a meaningful moral or political separation between the increasingly influential religious groups in government and the militant religious groups in society is becoming harder to maintain. Reports of the pragmatism of the MMA's policies in the provincial governments need to be taken with a grain of salt. To discount the force of the Jamaat's purist Islamist convictions is to discount Maududism on its home turf. Qutb's global following and Khomeini's successful revolution should remind us of the enduring strength of Maududi's message. To scant the social agenda of the religious parties is to misread their strategic agenda. There should not be any question about the Jamaat's aims or those of its partners. Whenever their men have entered parliament, they have agitated for the imposition of *sharia,* or Islamic law. And it is the full imposition and control of *sharia* by a religious state, rather than fringe victories by the more militant JUI and JUP affiliates, that can seal the ideological orientation and the political fate of Pakistan.

There is an argument making the rounds that there is no point now in casting one's lot with Muslim secularists, as they no longer speak for most Pakistanis. But this bleak view of things gives up the fight too soon. There are many liberal Muslims and many Muslim liberals in Pakistan, many devout and many devoutly modern. The struggle for Pakistan is not over. If the state is strong, customary laws can be changed, because they cannot claim divinity. It is worth remembering, too, that Pakistani voters never voted the Jamaat or the other MMA members into parliament in anything but tiny numbers until October 2002—that is, in the wake of the American war in Afghanistan and a spike in anti-Americanism. It is also worth remembering that even as the religious parties agitate against the unconstitutionality of Musharraf's political and electoral reforms of 2002, they are not behaving as constitutional democrats in the provinces that they control. And every day new ground is being lost: as Musharraf struggles to hold on to his two hats—he is president and chief of army staff—he may find himself buying off the religious opposition (some of them are for sale) at a very high price: by giving them more places of power in the center.

There are still many millions of secularists in Pakistan: in the 2002 elections; after all, Bhutto's PPP won the largest share of the popular vote. And Pakistan's cultural roots are older than its religious roots: the cultures of Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab, and the Frontier claim a broad diversity of religious practice, including the worship of saints in the rural areas. In addition, changing urban relations among men and women are shaped more by the new economic circumstances of work and travel than by religion.

Militant Islamists wield the most guns and exercise the most street power, but it is wrong to buy their argument that they have a superior claim to speak for Pakistanis because the country was constituted as a Muslim nation and is constitutionally an Islamic republic. Jinnah may not have won the Muslim entity he bargained for, but the critical fact is that there has always been a healthy—indeed, a precious—absence of agreement on what constitutes an Islamic state in Pakistan among jurists, theologians, and political leaders. (Even the MMA parties today disagree bitterly on theological principles and political goals.) The majority of Pakistanis do not seem to want the mullahs to define their politics. These encouraging realities are precisely what has protected the Pakistani state from dissolving in a bloody war.

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III.

BENNETT JONES PROPOSES, AND many in the United States concur, that the Pakistani army under Musharraf is the best of a bad lot, the only force that can avert disaster in Pakistan. Musharraf's own survival is generally thought to be Pakistan's and America's last hope against the extremists. And Musharraf has spoken of making bold changes in Pakistan's trajectory, often speaking in front of a portrait of Jinnah. In an extraordinarily powerful speech in January 2002, he called for ridding Pakistan of extremisms; and challenged those who questioned the Muslimness of others; and suggested that Pakistan should aspire to be a "progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare state" of the sort that Jinnah and Iqbal would have supported, rather than a theocracy; and announced the reform of the *madrassas* that preached violence and produced semi-literate religious scholars; and promised to act against any Pakistan-based group supporting terrorism inside or outside Pakistan. But owing to lack of desire or to force of circumstance, these powerful words have not yet been accompanied by powerful deeds.

As Bennett Jones recognizes, however, while it promotes itself as the solution to Pakistan's woes, the army is also part of the problem. It is his predecessors' legacy in creating Pakistan's predicament that has made it so difficult for Musharraf to reverse course. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Pakistani army pursued policies towards India (supporting *jihadis* to stoke the indigenous insurrection in Kashmir, and nurturing the Taliban in Afghanistan) that brought extremism homeward, and incurred defense costs that made moot any government attempt to strengthen the social sector in Pakistan. It has made use of the religious parties and Islamist militants to accomplish its goals.

The decisive event for the army vis-à-vis India came earlier, in 1971, when the genocidal civil war that left up to three million dead resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, and in India's intervention in that war, and in the subsequent humiliating surrender of ninety thousand prisoners of war. The army has never forgotten. The destruction of Pakistan in 1971 should have also put paid to the notion that the army was the savior of the nation. Instead, less than a decade later, Zia's dictatorship sought salvation for Pakistan in an Islamized army. He promoted the deliberate Islamization of the middle and lower ranks of the army (many members of which are now higher-ups) and the gradual militarization of the *madrassas*. In the decade that followed, as Pakistan was cut off economically and militarily from interactions with America in particular, the introversion and the anti-Americanism of the junior officers increased. As Weaver reports, Musharraf has remarked to General Anthony Zinni that his biggest problem arises from the fact that "seventy-five percent of my officers have never been out of Pakistan."

Zia's legacy contrasts sharply with the social liberalism of one of his predecessors, General Ayub Khan, which was embodied in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1962, the most liberal body of family law known to Pakistan. And Zia's Islamization programs may have rendered both Ayub's socially liberal achievements in family law and Musharraf's present ambitions besides the point. Whether or not Musharraf truly wants to fashion "a modernist, liberal" Pakistan, as Bennett Jones believes, there is very little scope for him now to win the ideological war for Pakistan, at least incrementally. Fighting Zia's legacy would require taking a page from Zia's book—using the full force of his vision to shape a new beginning.

STUDENTS OF PAKISTAN ARE FREquently frustrated in the search for what Bennett Jones calls "an effective national cement," the ideological intangible that could pull Pakistan away from its fissiparousness. (He has a good chapter on the various sub-nationalisms.) And yet there is most certainly a Pakistani identity, shaped by the common experiences of the last fifty years, by perceptions of the other (that is, of India), and by an imagined future that was once Pakistan's past: I mean the dream of a prosperous democracy. The problem is that the "cement" in Pakistan now is often provided not by democratic and equitable political arrangements that might salve wounds in the weaker provinces, ethnicities, and linguistic groups, but by reactions to external phenomena: the rise of Hindu chauvinism in India,

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

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the Kashmir quarrel, and American policies in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

The rise of Hindu chauvinism, of an anti-secular and anti-democratic vision of a Hindu India in which 140 million Muslims will find themselves in jeopardy, brings Pakistanis together. Although the religious parties and others in Pakistan have shown little interest in the trajectory of India's Muslims in the past, Hindutva's spread in the last decade has provoked their shared fears. The terrible retributive Gujarat massacres last year—in which as many as 2,000 Muslims were killed, and some 150,000 Muslims became refugees, and at least 250 girls were viciously gang-raped and burned alive—received scandalously little condemnation by world leaders. In the Pakistani consciousness, however, it reinforced the sense of threat from an India in which a politicized Hindu extremism, lubricated by diaspora dollars, has become insurgent.

The Kashmir conflict has been promoted by successive Pakistani leaders, civilian and military, to reinforce Pakistani nationalism whenever it has been politically expedient. The Pakistani argument for Kashmir has merit; but whatever the historical rights and wrongs of the issue, continuing the wars in Kashmir in order to "bleed India," where an estimated thirty to sixty thousand people have died, has given Pakistan's leaders not a progressive nationalism, but a way to gain populist support, an expensive hostility, and a militarized society. The Pakistan of the army, followed closely by the Pakistan of the civilian politicians, has long put the freedom of Kashmiris from Indian rule ahead of the freedom of Pakistanis from illiteracy, inequality, and poverty.

And there is also the "cement" of anti-Americanism, which is growing among Pakistanis. The religious parties raise a daily cacophony of threats to America—that infiltrator of secularism and "the colors of Western thought and civilization," says a Jamaat leader. Islamist terrorists kill Americans in Pakistan. Millions of other Pakistanis feel trapped between these Islamists and what they view as a dominant and un-self-questioning America. Its use of force in Iraq, its perceived preferences—for India over Pakistan, for Musharraf over all others—cause frustration and even fear, as do the post–September 11 policies of registration, immigration, and detention affecting Muslim and Pakistani men in America. Many liberal Pakistanis see hard times ahead as they struggle to find a definition of Pakistan's national identity. They ask whether an America that sees the world in "with us or against us" terms can truly help them negotiate the complexities of their riven state, or merely suffocate them in an American embrace. Weaver's question about the diverging U.S.-Pakistan relationship is apt: "How long will it last?"

Pakistan is drastically in need of radical social reforms, but Musharraf has not delivered on his early promises. If Musharraf's sincerity as reformer is to be believed, then we might grimly conclude from his repeated frustrations and failures that it is already too late to arrest Pakistan's decline into theocratic radicalism and economic decrepitude. But I do not believe that it is too late. There are Pakistani social reformers working across the country. If the ideas of these groups, of the individuals and the organizations that keep plying for pluralism and the alleviation of poverty through education, health, micro-enterprise, philanthropy (Pakistanis are among the most charitable people on earth), and human rights—if these ideas are to have a last chance at survival, then they, I mean the good guys, must find a way to operate in the dangerous interstices between the Islamism that would eliminate them and the Americanism that will let them live only at the price of being disdained by their compatriots as America's proxies. They are trapped today between the religious fanatics and the loyalty demands of the American superpower.

The dangers posed by Pakistan's internal contestations should be clear; and so the loose talk about punishing Pakistan—launching preemptive strikes or threatening the country's nuclear capacities—should remain just that. Pakistan is a gargantuan challenge compared with Afghanistan and Iraq. It is Pakistanis themselves who must fight to roll back violence and Islamism if they are to secure an economic turnaround and their political freedoms. The United States and others must consider large-scale economic reconstruction assistance for Pakistan before the grand wars erupt, rather than after. And Musharraf must be held to his inspiring speech of January 2002. No one said the task of fixing Pakistan would be easy, but this is the task, and the power, that he has chosen for, and arrogated to, himself. ■

David Hajdu
Authenticity Blues

ALAN LOMAX: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1934–1997
Edited by Ronald D. Cohen
(Routledge, 362 pp., $30)

THE GRAMMY AWARDS, WHICH endure as one of American popular culture's more shameless celebrations of artifice, infantilism, and evanescence, will occasionally make a grand gesture in the name of authenticity, adulthood, or posterity by honoring an esteemed old-timer who hasn't sold any records since anyone can remember. In 1997, Pete Seeger, age seventy-seven, won this semi-annual Compensation and Distraction Award for what was then his most recent CD, titled *Pete*—a collection of plaintive moral and political parables much like the dozens and dozens of albums that he had been recording for more than fifty years. I was in the press horde at the Grammys that year, and I spent some time with Seeger backstage at Madison Square Garden as he waited for his allocated time on stage. For nearly an hour, he stood straight-backed, looking disarmingly natty in a tuxedo, greeting well-wishers and watching the event on a closed-circuit TV monitor. There were performances by Eric Clapton, Sheryl Crow, and the Smashing Pumpkins. After hearing them all, Seeger said: "I wonder what the music experts of

David Hajdu teaches in the MFA writing program at New School University and is the author of POSITIVELY 4TH STREET: THE LIVES AND TIMES OF JOAN BAEZ, BOB DYLAN, MIMI BAEZ FARIÑA, AND RICHARD FARIÑA *(Farrar, Straus & Giroux).*

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the 1930s would have thought if you had told them that the greatest influence on the popular music of this century would be some unknown black prisoners and field workers."

Six decades earlier, American popular music was certainly different from the earthy, rough-edged, blues-based sounds of rock-era artists such as Clapton and his contemporaries. In the age of Tin Pan Alley, most popular music was jazzy and sounded urban, and it endeavored to project an aura of sophistication. It was music created by professionals to reflect and to exploit the social aspirations of a people striving to recover from (or at least to forget) the Depression. Being

COURTESY ROUTLEDGE

Alan Lomax recording in La Plaine, Dominica, 1962

jazz-oriented, much of the music of the time was to a large degree black music, or a white imitation thereof—more specifically, a citified black music drawn from the urban experience of African Americans who had moved north in the Great Migration. Many of the artists whose songs made the Hit Parade in 1937—the vocalists Bing Crosby and Connee Boswell, the songwriters Cole Porter and Johnny Mercer—may have come from working-class immigrant stock (Crosby) and may have been Midwesterners (Boswell, Porter) or Southerners (Mercer), but owing to the lithe swing of the tunes, the singers' nonchalant crooning, and the sleek orchestral arrangements, everyone sounded like an urbane Manhattanite.

The contemporaneous music of Negroes laboring in prison or incarcerated in fieldwork—the blues of artists such as Leadbelly (Huddie Ledbetter, who had been an inmate at Angola Penitentiary in Louisiana) and Muddy Waters (McKinley Morganfield, who had been a farm laborer in Mississippi)—was not wholly unknown in the 1930s. It had innumerable practitioners and admirers within the culture of poor, rural, Southern blacks. Owing to its provenance, however, this music was largely unheard or unrecognized within the white musical establishment of the time. By the end of the 1950s, the blues would emerge as a permeating influence on American popular music. One generation after another, American young people raised in prosperity would turn to rock 'n' roll and its various incarnations (folk-rock, country-rock, punk, grunge, alt-rock, and the rest), all elementally indebted to the blues and to its aesthetic of raw, unaffected veracity. In the rock era, singers and songwriters (most artists now taking on both roles, as blues musicians always tended to do) may be from England (Clapton) or a middle-class neighborhood in Missouri (Crow), but they all seem to want to sound like old black prisoners and fieldworkers.

AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC NOT only changed styles, it jumped traditions, abandoning the formal and the schooled for the informal and the vernacular. It became more like non-literate music—like folk music. How or through whom? A creditable school of thought attributes much of this transformation to the folklorist, author, performer, and entrepreneur Alan Lomax, the man who "discovered" and first recorded Leadbelly and Muddy Waters. Seeger, writing in 1958, said that "he is more responsible than any other single individual for the whole revival of interest in American folk music." Brian Eno, the English art-rock composer, has gone further, writing (in 1993, in a blurb for Lomax's book *The Land Where the Blues Began*) that "without Lomax, it's possible that there would have been no blues explosion, no R&B movement, no Beatles and no Stones and no Velvet Underground." *Newsweek* has instructed its readers that "if not for Lomax, few people would have heard 'Tom Dooley' or 'Goodnight Irene,' and Bob Zimmerman might be singing 'Feelings' at Holiday Inns around Hibbing, Minnesota."

Lomax, who was otherwise disposed against popular opinion, would surely have agreed. He was a fearsome advocate of artists in whom he believed, and he himself needed no other champion. He wrote and edited nine major books (three with his father and mentor, the early-twentieth-century folklorist John A. Lomax) during his eighty-seven years, and most of them are about Alan Lomax. *The Land Where the Blues Began* begins where everything seemed to begin for Lomax—with Lomax. The opening paragraph alone contains thirteen references to the author, who aligns himself with his subjects as a noble, homespun victim of bias and elitism. ("Even after being snubbed, lectured, arrested, and once or twice shot at, I still persist in plunging straight for the bottom where the songs live.") His songbooks have aggrandizing accounts of Lomax's Homeric song searches, followed by lyrics and music inevitably "arranged and adapted" by Lomax (with his father, in many cases). And now, a year after his death, a new Lomax miscellany, *Alan Lomax: Selected Writings, 1934–1997*, edited and well annotated by the respected folk-music historian Ronald D. Cohen, fits neatly in the literature of Alan Lomax vainglory.

In an autobiographical section of the book, "Saga of a Folksong Hunter," Lomax muses that future scholars may see the twentieth century as "the age of the golden ear, when, for a time, a passionate aural curiosity overshadowed the ability to create music." In other words, those who merely composed and performed music were less important than apprecia-

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tive listeners such as Lomax. If so, then what was the reason for such passionate curiosity? Prospectors, after a few big strikes, used to suffer the same delusion: that the gold was in them rather than in the stones.

LOMAX WAS BORN INTO FOLKlore. He was only eighteen when he made his first field recordings of rural folksingers, accompanying his father, a folksong scholar then sixty-five years old, in the summer of 1933. The first piece of Lomax's in this volume is his account of that trip, "Sinful Songs of the Southern Negro." It is a boyish narrative, infused with the thrill of discovery, blithely arrogant, ignorant of the exoticism tainting its enthusiasms, adolescent in its obsession with the salacious—and so demeaning to its subjects, many of whom considered themselves above the bawdy material that Lomax prodded them to sing. They expressed their offense to him, but futilely. "We is all 'ligious men an' don' sing anything but sperchils, except maybe a few hollers now an' den when we got 'bout forty rods o' de devil in us," one singer told Lomax, who pressed to hear those "hollers" another time. Undaunted, Lomax soon located a more promising subject, Henry Truvillion, but found him "most disappointing" in his reticence to sing the unsavory tunes Lomax wanted. "We thought that if we could carry Henry off some Saturday night to a place where he could sit and talk out of sight of his wife or her callers, we should be able to get a marvelous store of songs and stories from him. This spring we intend to do just that."

Over the years, Lomax would always see folklore as "pure adventure" and something heroic. As he said at the Midcentury International Folklore Conference at Indiana University in 1950, in an address transcribed in *Selected Writings,* folklorists "rescue materials from oblivion" and "are making a better present and preparing for some sort of juster future for all people." By 1937, when Lomax was scarcely twenty-one, he was serving as director of the Archive of American Folk-Song at the Library of Congress. American culture was rising in prominence, elevating with it an interest in our native identity. As Lomax remarks in an interview edited into an article for this book, "The developing concern about what our own American culture was actually like, about who we were as people, peaked at this time. And the search for American folk roots was part of this."

LOMAX SAW THE MUSIC OF THE rural underclass as the unfiltered essence of the American ideal—"an expression of its democratic, interracial, international character ... a function of its inchoate and turbulent many-sided development," he wrote in 1941. Already a zealous archeologist of America's living folk culture, Lomax became its omnipresent spokesman and promoter, hosting radio programs, staging concerts, publishing songbooks, and producing records. Under Lomax, the Library of Congress amassed an archive of some twenty thousand pieces of American folk music, and the books of songs that Lomax collected (with his father and on his own) became fixtures on parlor spinets, in grade-school music classes, and in summer camps everywhere. Lomax remains best known and most esteemed for his work assembling and disseminating American folk music, which occupied him from the late 1930s until the 1950s (when he moved to London, expanding his research into the folk music of other societies).

Lomax was so close to the roots of our musical culture that he saw nothing higher. "Of all ... creations, which culture is the most valuable?" Lomax asked. "And by this I do not mean culture with a capital 'C'—that body of art which critics have selected out of the literate traditions of Western Europe—but rather the total accumulation of man's fantasy and wisdom ... that still persist in full vitality in the folk and primitive places of our planet." More bluntly, he stated outright elsewhere that "folklore has a staying power unrivaled by even the greatest of cultivated art." However spirited his talk about "democratic and equalitarian beliefs," Lomax had no interest in challenging the idea of a hierarchy within the arts; he wanted only to alter the rankings, with his own preferences at the top.

Lomax's patronage was exclusionary. He reveled in his position as the Maecenas of rural America—"The role of the folklorist is that of the advocate of the folk," he said, and he defended his constituency with fervor. Seeing a kind of Rousseauian purity in the ascetic lives of the impoverished country folk whom he encountered in his field research, Lomax (who grew up in Texas, where his father was teaching college) characterized their lore as intrinsically virtuous, as an expression of "the beautiful and the good." "In folklore ... you get a general ethical tone," he observed, "a kind of rudimentary humanistic approach to life ... a very deep sense of values." Even in the South, where the folk culture of rural whites was steeped in racism, Lomax argued, "Jim Crow prejudice has been inoperative in folklore."

By extension, Lomax tended to demonize what he perceived as forces in opposition to those of his favored rural South: the North, the city, technology, business, "sophistication"—and jazz, being a sophisticated music associated with Northern cities. Lomax did write a biography of Jelly Roll Morton, who considered himself the inventor of jazz, but he dismissed most jazz as a corruption of folk music. In his preface to the 1993 edition of that book, moreover, Lomax added a bizarre rant against Harlem and its reputation as a black cultural center—"New York's Harlem, which so often has taken all the credit for black cultural innovations.... [And] where the carriers of the great tradition were few, where big bands with horn sections were replacing the lacy counterpoint of New Orleans." Why did his sympathies for the disenfranchised preclude the urban underclass? In Lomax's account, the Mason-Dixon line is a moral and aesthetic barrier, and folk poetry could never come from the city street.

WHEELING HIS SOUNDrecording gear around Negro quarters of the segregated South, Lomax never realized how far he was from familiar ground. His writings show that his understanding of black culture was critically flawed, and that his attitudes toward African Americans were discomforting, no matter how virtuous he may have held his motives to be. His descriptions of his hosts and their environments are tainted with an air of superior bemusement ("A billowing Negro matron in a beautiful red turban and her husband, a toothless cotton-headed old fellow with a mouthful of snuff"), and his manner of re-creating dialogue is straight out of an Uncle Remus story: "I'll sing dat song right easy foh you, ef you want me!" and "Dat's a sho'-God song!"

Lomax seemed to think that he was extending compliments when he was

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oozing noble-savage condescension, praising Leadbelly's musical skill as "natural" and describing black faith as a "primitive" Christianity. In his songbook *American Ballads,* Lomax wrote that "modern education prove[d] disastrous to the Negro's folk singing, destroying much of the quaint, innate beauty of the songs." When a Negro inmate at Tennessee State Prison expressed a hope that the recording he made would help him gain his freedom, Lomax said he found the prisoner's dream "pathetic beyond tears."

His conception of the African American musical tradition was no more enlightened. In preparing the words and the music that he collected for publication in songbooks, Lomax was frustrated to find the verses to some songs he recorded Negroes singing to be "jumbled" and "disconnected." Storylines changed in the middle of songs, characters appeared and disappeared without explanation, the point of view shifted. The songs were not linear narratives, adhering to familiar story patterns. They were more like mixed-up puzzle pieces or collages of imagery that played off one another in unexpected ways. Lomax's response was to edit and to re-organize the lyrics, taking one verse from one singer's version of a song and one from another's, fashioning a composite that was conventionally lucid, all in the name of "coherence." In the process, he stripped off a layer of the songs' black identity—their way of provoking feeling through juxtaposition and mystery, an African American tradition—and replaced it with a sleek white gloss.

LOMAX MADE SOME CONTRIBUtions of great merit; he was not all bad. He took blues seriously at a time when few whites in the cultural establishment gave it much thought. Through his field research and his advocacy of the music, exposure and opportunity came to blues and folk artists (such as Leadbelly, Muddy Waters, Sun House, and Aunt Molly Jackson) who had enjoyed limited regional recognition or none at all. Would they have surfaced without Lomax? Perhaps. Isn't the blues something that cannot be denied? Absolutely. But so is the historical record. However things might have gone hypothetically, the way they happened was that Lomax introduced the world at large to several of the most original and influential blues and folk musicians in American history.

Though his Library of Congress recordings and his songbooks, Lomax imparted institutional legitimacy upon a minority music and helped to bring it to a broader public. One could argue that the formal documentation of any folk materials kills them: by definition, a folk song is supposed to be orally transmitted and unfixed—there should be no "correct," official version. If so, one could counter, the traduction—no, the violence—that Lomax committed was justifiable. Not long ago James Taylor gave a nationally televised concert from a theater in New York, and he sang a powerful traditional tune called "Wasn't That a Mighty Flood," mentioning on the air that he had learned it from a performance by the veteran blues singer Eric von Schmidt. I asked von Schmidt where he had learned it, and he said he discovered it in the late 1940s, when he and a friend had driven from his native Connecticut to the Library of Congress in a pilgrimage to hear the Lomax recordings. There they found the song, sung a cappella "as a prison kind of spiritual" by a singer whom von Schmidt recalls as Sin-Killer Griffin.

As an early proponent of ethnomusicology, moreover, Lomax was forward-minded in his interest in the relationship between music, gender, and sexual mores. (Although Lomax was engaged in aspects of musicology and ethnomusicology, at points deeply, he kept his distance from academia, declining numerous offers of university posts.) Ultimately, though, Lomax's self-interest and sense of proprietorship poisoned his legacy. While he thought of the last century as his era ("the age of the golden ear"), he was really a nineteenth-century figure—a domestic colonialist who mistook "discovery" for creation and advocacy for ownership.

THE DETAILS OF LOMAX'S ASSOciation with Leadbelly are a case study in exploitative paternalism. Lomax first encountered Huddie Ledbetter in 1933, during one of his song-collecting ventures with his father. As the younger Lomax recalled in *Selected Writings,* "Leadbelly called himself 'de king of de twelve-string guitar players ob de world.' He wasn't modest, but he was right. From him we got our richest store of folk songs, over a hundred new songs that Leadbelly had heard since his childhood in Morningsport, Louisiana, and had varied to fit his own singing and playing style." Leadbelly, incarcerated at the time, "begged us to help him get out of prison," Lomax wrote. In their benevolence, the Lomaxes assented. When the newly freed musician heard that his benefactors were heading to New York, he "begged to accompany us," Lomax continued.

Working with his father and later on his own, Alan Lomax oversaw Leadbelly's career, setting up concerts, nightclub engagements, and recording sessions. Lomax also had that rich store of Leadbelly's songs published, with his own name (and in many cases his father's name, too) listed as a co-composer on more than three dozen of the works, ensuring that Lomax (and his heirs) would earn as much in royalties as the musician who brought him the songs. These swindled compositions included "Rock Island Line" and "Goodnight, Irene," the latter of which, in its recording by the Weavers in 1950, was the number-one hit single on the pop-music charts for thirteen weeks and sold two million copies. Lomax liked this classic show-business grift of "cutting in" on song royalties, an old favorite of powerful business managers (such as Irving Mills, who put his name on the credits of dozens of early Duke Ellington works) and singers (including Elvis Presley, acting under the direction of his overseer Colonel Tom Parker). He liked it so much that his name appears next to those of Leadbelly, Memphis Slim, Vera Hall, and others on the copyrights of nearly one hundred compositions, including "Tom Dooley" and "This Train."

In this, the so-called "Year of the Blues," Lomax endures as an influence of multiple dimensions. The earthy, unadorned music that he loved pervades our society. (How would American industry sell its cars, its snacks, and its drinks without the electric guitar music in its commercials?) Yet variations on the Lomax model of cultural imperialism continue—indeed, they have gone global, with American record producers and music promoters (and musicians such as Paul Simon, David Byrne, and Ry Cooder) scouring the world for worthy musical discoveries whose "authenticity" might also happen to save their own careers. Alan Lomax deserves recognition, even gratitude; but so does my paperboy, and that doesn't make him the author of the stuff. ■

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AUSCHWITZ DIARIST

Pilgrims' Progress

AS WE EMERGE FROM THE underground crematoriums, Ali, a leader of the Arab Israeli Scouts movement, links his arm in mine. "Does it make it easier or harder to deal with the past by coming here?" he asks. For a Jew to be comforted by an Arab in Auschwitz is so counterintuitive that all my accumulated rage, from the Holocaust to the intifada, yields to grief.

WE ARE PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST pilgrimage by Arab and Jewish Israelis to Auschwitz. There are 260 of us, almost evenly divided between Jews and Arabs, joined by 200 Muslims, Christians, and Jews from France. The Arab Israelis include professionals for whom coexistence with Jews is routine. One Arab Israeli doctor who heads an emergency ward tells me, "I haven't missed a terrorist attack." The Jews include the rabbi of a West Bank settlement, who says that, when your neighbor tries to feel your pain, you must respond, and a former Knesset member from the ultra-dovish Meretz Party, which expelled him for seeking common ground with rightists. Our starting point is political despair. We are entering the abyss together, hoping to emerge in some way transformed. It's no coincidence that this pilgrimage was conceived by a priest, Emile Shoufani, an Arab Catholic from Nazareth, whom we all call "Abuna," Arabic for father. Abuna speaks grandly of creating "a new human being." Fostering dialogue between Israeli Arabs and Jews seems ambitious enough.

I DIDN'T WANT TO COME. FOR YEARS, I've avoided the Holocaust, convinced that, as a survivor's son who had experienced militant Zionism in my teens, group therapy in my twenties, immigration to Israel in my thirties, and spiritual journeys in my forties, I had exhausted my ability to find some way to respond to the event that formed me. And I've long resisted linking the Holocaust with Israel's predicament. After all, Jews hardly need Auschwitz to feel vulnerable today.

FINALLY, I WORRIED ABOUT ARAB EXpectations of a false reciprocity: Your Holocaust for our *nakba* ("catastrophe"), the term Arabs use for the creation of Israel. But Abuna set a precondition for Arab participants: No comparisons between our suffering and theirs. In the late '90s, I undertook a journey of prayer into mosques and monasteries. When the Palestinians began their current terrorist war, though, I felt too betrayed to continue reaching out. Only an Arab attempt to understand us, I decided, could renew my capacity for empathy. Now, here was a group of Arab Israelis trying to do precisely that. On the bus to Auschwitz, an Arab woman takes the mike. She has joined us, she explains, because she fears the anger that's distorting her. That is why I've come: not to save the Middle East but myself.

ABUNA SET ANOTHER PRECONDITION, this one for both Arabs and Jews: No politics. To bring together Jewish and Arab Israelis and forbid them to argue politics borders on abuse. That restraint is itself the beginning of a new discourse. And it's contagious. As we enter the Auschwitz complex, I mention to an Arab woman that I'm named for a grandfather who was murdered here. "Arabs had nothing to do with this," she says. "The Palestinians are also victims of this place." What about Arab pressure on the British to turn back refugee boats? Or the Mufti, the Palestinian leader who spent the war years as a Nazi propagandist in Berlin? But I sense that she's speaking not from anger but distress. And so I say nothing.

IN ONE SENSE, ARAB ISRAELIS ARE OUR natural partners. However unhappily, we share a common citizenship and speak together in Hebrew. Yet, in the last few years, we've become dangerously alienated, caught between Arab resentment over Jewish discrimination and Jewish suspicion of Arab treason. For Arabs, a Jewish state means their permanent displacement to the periphery of Israeli society. For Jews, Arab insistence on a binational Israel is considered a plan to destroy us: First, create a Palestinian state emptied of Jews; then, empty Israel of Jewishness. The very existence of the other in our midst threatens our sense of home. Perhaps that's the real issue we've come to confront in Auschwitz, where existence was a crime.

INEVITABLY, THERE ARE TENSIONS. WHEN a Christian Arab woman reads aloud a poem asking how God could have allowed "the people you chose" to be murdered, other Arabs are outraged at her seeming identification with Judaism. And, in coming here together, we all take emotional risks. For the Arab participants, who have been attacked by their own media as traitors, conceding the enormity of their enemy's tragedy risks diminishing their own. For Jews, coming to the place that teaches us the necessity of power, together with Arabs who threaten that power, risks weakening our will to fight for survival. The result of our mutual risk-taking is an exchange of sensibilities. Jews acknowledge that Auschwitz isn't just a Jewish but a universal wound, while our Arab partners discover Jewish outrage. "Where was the world?" they demand. And, with unintended irony, "Why didn't the Jews fight back?" Referring to the Nazis, a Bedouin social worker invokes that old Jewish curse, "*Y'mach shmam*" ("may their names be blotted out"), as if he were from Brooklyn.

"YOU ARE TRAPPED IN THE PATHOLOGY of our Jewish story," I say to Abuna. "We can free each other," he replies. Arabs hold the hands of elderly survivors; Jews weep on Abuna's shoulder. For Arabs to mourn Jewish suffering and for Jews to trust Arabs in Auschwitz is subversive. I confess, I had wanted Arabs to emerge from this journey "understanding" Israel's predicament. No doubt some of our Arab Israeli partners had similar hidden hopes about us. Now those expectations seem vulgar. For now, I want nothing more than to be together with these people in this place.

WE GATHER FOR THE ISRAELI CUSTOM of reciting the names of victims. This time, though, Arabs read the names. While much of the Arab world promotes Holocaust denial, here Arabs are affirming the legitimacy of our story. Whatever disagreements await our return to Israel, I know that, for my Arab partners, the notion of Jews being murdered for being Jews has become unbearable. Listening to the Yiddish names recited in Arabic accents, I sense a new language being born.

YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI

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...ach to War

Bruce Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

...ast decade, [illegible] and for good or bad, by ...how it wages war. Let us look back, then, on how the United States has fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts since the end of the cold war.

What we see is the development of an "American style of war," reflecting both our capabilities and our values, with at least three distinct features:

The first is a *reluctance to take casualties.* During the 1970s and 1980s pundits often talked about a "Vietnam syndrome"—a fear of any operation that might cost American lives, subsequently disproved by Desert Storm. But the reluctance to suffer casualties was more than just a reaction to Vietnam.

Democracies run on public support; politicians who send soldiers to long, costly wars lose support—and lose office. So far, this has not been a problem. Casualties in the two gulf wars, for example, were light. But it makes one wonder whether we could attempt a more costly operation, such as a defense of South Korea.

The second feature is a *reluctance to inflict casualties.* There is always controversy whenever U.S. forces inadvertently hit noncombatants. But Americans have little taste even for inflicting enemy military casualties. Recall the "Highway of Death" during the first gulf war, when U.S. air attacks on fleeing Iraqi forces turned into a turkey shoot. U.S. leaders feared the public reaction and cut the operation short—leaving Saddam Hussein a threat.

Today the United States has a defense policy that aims to minimize the death and destruction of warfare—the very qualities that define war. Few countries have held themselves to this standard. Just look at the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Russia's war in Chechnya, or the various wars between India and Pakistan.

The third feature is *sensitivity to international opinion.* Unlike France (which regularly intervenes in its former colonies without consulting anyone), American leaders try to show that the United States has support abroad. Even so, U.S. leaders do not equate the "United Nations" with "world opinion." Operation Iraqi Freedom (like operations in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo) showed that U.S. leaders reject the idea that the UN has special moral authority.

One can argue whether this approach makes sense from a military point of view, but we need to prepare accordingly. The Defense Department should spend more on weapons that minimize collateral damage and create larger stockpiles to conduct the kinds of operations we plan today. We also need more networked communications and databases, rapid response capabilities, and the ability to provide better covert logistic support.

If Americans have a phobia about enemy casualties, we need to invest more in nonlethal weapons, such as stun guns and immobilizing devices, especially if we hope to defeat rogue states and terrorists, both of which are capable of using civilians as human shields.

This approach to war may not be easy, but it reflects values we can be proud of. So we need to prepare to win wars "in the American style"—and be aware of the risks we run in doing so.

— Bruce Berkowitz

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

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